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Divisiveness, National Narratives, and the
Establishment Clause
Gilad Abiri*
Abstract
The Supreme Court habitually justifies the Establishment
Clause as a means to prevent political division, protect the civil
peace, and forestall citizen alienation. In spite of this popularity
among the judiciary, legal scholars have emphatically rejected
the political division theory. They state that religion is not
especially divisive, and that even if it was, there is no reason to
think non-establishment will prevent such political harm. This
rejection relies on the misconception that the validity of the
political division theory requires that all forms of religion must
foment civil strife. This is a mistake. Often, laws apply to a wider
category than to the core of what they seek to address. If this is
the case, then even if non-establishment comes to merely prevent
an especially erosive type of state and religion involvement, it
may still be a valid and useful theory.
In this Article, I argue that the political division theory is
compelling when it is applied to a religion which seeks to collapse
the distinction between politics and religion. To achieve this, I
portray one such form of establishment of religion: American
Christian Nationality, an ideology which sees the United States
as having deep religious meaning and promotes Christianity as
the central attribute of American identity. This Article will show
that the combination between nationality and religion is
uniquely divisive because it promotes a religious-based
exclusionary understanding of who is a “real” American citizen.
Many of the canonical Establishment Clause doctrines seem
Post-Doctoral Global Fellow, NYU Law School. I am deeply grateful to Paul
Kahn and Anthony Kronman for countless conversations, insightful feedback,
and guidance. This Article benefited greatly from comments and suggestions
made by Samuel Moyn, David Grewal, Shai Wozner, Jaclyn Neo, Brett
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participants in workshops at Yale Law School, the National University of
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tailored to protect against government involvement in such
religious movements.
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I. Introduction
During the Value Voters Summit held in Washington, D.C.,
in September 2016, Donald Trump, then a contender in the
Republican presidential primaries, made a statement that was
met with a standing ovation. He started by declaring that under
his administration, “our Christian heritage will be cherished,
protected, defended like you’ve never seen before.”1 He went
further to declare his disdain for the Johnson Amendment,
which prohibits tax exempt religious institutions from
supporting or opposing political candidates, stating that it
“blocked our pastors and ministers and others from speaking
their minds from their own pulpits. If they want to talk about
Christianity, if they want to preach, if they want to talk about
politics, they are unable to do so.”2 In a more recent tweet,
1. Eugene Scott, Trump Says He’s Fulfilled His Promises to Christians,
but He Really Means White Evangelicals, WASH. POST (Oct. 15, 2017, 10:00
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/10/15/trumpsays-hes-fulfilled-his-promises-to-christians-but-he-really-means-whiteevangelicals/.
2. Ellen Aprill, Trump Wants to Force You—the Taxpayer—to Pay for
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President Trump applauded the fact that “[n]umerous states
introducing Bible Literacy classes, giving students the option of
studying the Bible. Starting to make a turn back? Great!”3
These controversial statements—unparalleled in modern
presidential history—show that we are at a watershed moment
with regard to the separation of church and state. This demands
that, as a society, we re-engage with, and perhaps recommit to,
the fundamental justifications for keeping religion out of
politics, and politics out of religion.
Nearly fifty years ago, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, Chief Justice
Warren Burger declared that the purpose of the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment is to protect against the harmful
political effects of state involvement in religion.4 In his words,
“political division along religious lines was one of the principal
evils against which the First Amendment was intended to
protect. The potential divisiveness of such conflict is a threat to
the normal political process.”5 He is not alone; in fact, the
political division theory for non-establishment is by far the most
often cited justification for the separation of church and state in
Supreme Court cases.6 In stark contrast to its popularity among
the justices, an overwhelming majority of legal scholars have
emphatically rejected the political division theory as judicial
folly.7 Religion, they argue, is not an especially divisive force in
American Society, and even if it was, there is no reason to think
that non-establishment will resolve this divisiveness.
In this Article, I argue that the political division theory, if
understood correctly, is actually a fitting justification for the
Establishment Clause. Specifically, I argue that in opposing the
political division theory, most scholars assume this theory
entails that all forms of religion must foment civil strife and
endanger peaceful politics. This is a mistake; even if nonestablishment is used to merely prevent one especially erosive
type of establishment, it may still make sense to separate church
Campaigning from the Pulpit, WASH. POST (Feb. 3, 2017, 6:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/02/03/trumpwants-to-force-taxpayers-to-pay-for-campaigning-from-the-pulpit/.
3. Donald J. Trump (@RealDonaldTrump), Tᴡɪᴛᴛᴇʀ (Jan. 28, 2019, 8:21
AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1089876055224184833.
4. 403 U.S.602, 622 (1971).
5. Id.
6. See infra Part II.
7. See discussion infra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1.
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and state generally. This result has crucial implications for the
interpretation of the Establishment Clause and its specific
doctrines.
To achieve this, I portray one such form of establishment of
religion: American Christian Nationality,8 an ideology which
sees the United States as having a deep religious meaning and
promotes Christianity as the central attribute of American
identity. I will show that this combination between nationality
and religion is both uniquely divisive and can be largely
addressed by adherence to non-establishment doctrine. I argue,
first, that the equation of American identity with Christianity
(or any religion for that matter) will necessarily alienate and
exclude many American citizens. Such an exclusion could create
grave political harm. Subsequently, I argue that this harmful
effect can be (and in fact, is) abated by a strict interpretation of
the Establishment Clause. Strong methods of separation of
church and state put significant hurdles in the way of the
political project of Christian nationality. This danger is not
hypothetical, as tales of woe, like the ascent to dominance of
Hindu nationalism in India, suggest that Jefferson’s wall of
separation may need bolstering.
This Article offers three central contributions: first and
foremost, it intervenes in the debate on the meaning and
justification of the Establishment Clause and seeks to put
theoretical weight in support of the intuitive strength and
judicial popularity of the political division theory; second, it
argues that the political division theory should influence
Establishment Clause doctrine, potentially distinguishing
between public facing and reclusive types of governmental
involvement in religion; third, this Article offers an innovative
conceptualization of the challenge that religious nationality
8. The choice of the term “nationality” is intentional. In choosing it, I
follow the contemporary lead of the important political theorist David Miller
in his book On Nationality, and, classically, of John Stuart Mill in his
Considerations on Representative Government. See JOHN STUART MILL,
CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (Prometheus Books, 2006)
(1861); DAVID MILLER, ON NATIONALITY (David Miller & Allen Ryan eds., 1995).
The issue of using the more common term “nationalism” is that it is often
interpreted as including moral condemnation, and is thought to include
positions that are unpalatable from a liberal perspective. This does not fit the
thrust of this Article, which does not seek to morally condemn either American
Civic Nationality or Christian nationality. For this reason, I chose to try and
avoid such interpretative baggage by using another term.
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poses for liberal constitutionalism generally, and specifically for
American First Amendment doctrine. By doing so, it offers a
novel analysis of Christian nationality in the context of
constitutional law.
First, the Article first lays out the two main variations of the
political division theory: the civil peace variation and the
alienation rationales variation for non-establishment and
explores the common objections they face. In both of these
theories, the purpose of non-establishment is the prevention of
the harmful political effects of religion. These rationales are
commonly based on the argument that religion as an ideology is,
by its nature, especially divisive and entrenched. Therefore,
conflicts surrounding it are particularly pernicious.
Consequently, under these rationales, at least one of the
purposes of the separation of church and state is to eliminate the
ability of religious groups to compete for state power. These
rationales lead constitutional courts toward either judicial
neutrality or to a strict interpretation of non-establishment.
Legal scholars summarily dismiss these rationales, noting that
religion as a topic is not especially divisive in the United States,
and asserting that race and inequality appear to provide far
more significant sources of social strife. Religious groups are
also not necessarily more intolerant than other ideological
groups, as attested to by the many progressive religious
denominations. This is commonly believed to mean that the civil
peace and alienation rationales fail to explain the
distinctiveness of religion in the Establishment Clause.
Second, the Article starts addressing these objections by
developing an account of the ideology of Christian nationality.
Focusing on the American case, both contemporary and
historical, I define an ideology of religious (in our case Christian)
nationality as one in which the ultimate provider of legitimacy
for state power is not the people, but the Divine. With their
insistence on Divine rather than civil authority, ideologies of
religious nationality inevitably seek a unification of politics and
religion. Supporters of Christian nationality view Christianity
as the defining mark of the nation; they also view the authority
of the state as derived from a divine source, and not from the will
of the popular sovereign; finally, they see the nation-state as an
important part in the divine program.
Third, the Article argues that Christian nationality in the
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United States has the unique status of an intimate rival. It is
intimate of mainstream politics since Christians are able to—
due to significant overlap with American civil religion—
successfully present themselves as the carriers of the authentic
character of the nation-state and utilize modern political tools.
And it is rival because Christians promote a vision of society and
politics which fundamentally challenges the political identity of
the state generally, and American civil nationality specifically.
This means that unlike outright rivals, such as communist
parties or competing national groups, Christian nationality is
able to co-exist with American civil nationality while vying for
political and cultural power.
Fourth, based on my account of the intimate rivalry of
Christian nationality, this Article argues that although the civil
peace and alienation rationales fail when applied to religion
generally, they are far more persuasive when applied to
Christian nationality.
There are two reasons to believe
Christian nationality is an especially divisive ideology. First,
unlike most other religious ideologies, Christian nationality is
theologically invested in the behavior of the state and its
citizens. As part of this, Christian nationality promotes an
exclusionary idea of who is a fully fledged American, which is
very likely to create alienation and resentment if promoted by
the state. Equating being an American with being a Christian
is quite literally dividing the citizen body along religious lines.
Second, adherents to Christian nationality exhibit higher
intolerance levels than almost any other group. These are
fundamentalist and revivalist religious movements, which see
themselves as the only source of morality and knowledge in
society. These mechanisms of intolerance, together with the fact
that, as an intimate rival, Christian nationality is uniquely
situated to influence and even dramatically transform the state,
make the case that the fear of the divisive political effect of
Christian nationality is well warranted.
The Article then turns to argue that this state of affairs
supports a policy of non-establishment. This is because of two
reasons: first, the main alternative to non-establishment,
namely free exercise, seems ineffectual in the face of an ideology
which is concerned with getting the state itself to behave in a
way more consistent with their religious beliefs; second, nonestablishment seems tailored to battle the risk of intimate
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rivalry. If the fear is that Christian nationality is more capable
of influencing the state than other religious ideologies, then that
is a reason to build the wall of separation of church and state
both high and tall. Subsequently, I argue that although the
political division theory is convincing only in the case of an
ideology that combines religion and nationality, it is still
reasonable to apply the Establishment Clause to religion as a
general category. This is because it is both impossible and
undesirable for courts to make a distinction between dangerous
and benign forms of religion.
Lastly, the Article explores some possible policy
implications of the proposed interpretation of the political
division theory. First, I argue that although the impossibility of
accurately identifying religious nationality in the United States
makes it reasonable to prohibit the establishment of any
religion, non-establishment may still be applied in different
intensities: tailoring the treatment to the different concerns
raised by the vector of the proposed establishment. I will
suggest that it makes sense to distinguish expansive
establishment from generic establishment.
Expansive
establishment seeks to transform the political sphere, which
must be suspect under the political division theory, while
establishment seeks to defend religious communities and enable
them to survive, and perhaps even thrive.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II presents and
analyzes the civil peace and alienation rationales for nonestablishment.
Part III provides background definitions,
distinguishes between religious and civic nationality, and
concisely outlines both American civil religion and American
Christian nationality. This part concludes by developing the
argument that American Christian nationality has a status of
intimate rivalry. Part IV suggests that the civil peace and
alienation rationales are far more plausible when applied to
Christian nationality. Part V offers preliminary thoughts on
how to advance Establishment Clause theory in accordance with
the political division theory.
II. The Rejection of the Political Division Theory
The vast majority of liberal constitutional regimes,
including that of the United States, consider religion as a
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distinct phenomenon warranting special treatment. In the
United States, the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(“RFRA”) states that the “[g]overnment shall not substantially
burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability” unless this burden promotes
a “compelling governmental interest” in the least restrictive way
possible.9 Successful claims were brought under this statute,
and similar ones passed by states, under the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment for religious exemptions in the
fields of compulsory education,10 rules regulating animal
slaughter,11 health insurance regulation,12 civil rights statutes,
and more. At the same time, the most dramatic example of
treating religions distinctly is the separation of church and
state. Under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment,
religious organizations are, in principle, excluded from receiving
any government support. The pervasiveness of doctrines and
statutes that expressly single out religious beliefs13 suggests
that these beliefs possess special attributes and functions that
distinguish them from non-religious beliefs.
Indeed, the
anomalous and special status of religion is a central topic in
constitutional theory and in case law.
The goal in this Part, and in the Article generally, is to lay
out one attempt to solve the conundrum of the special status of
religion under the Establishment Clause. In so doing, this Part
will examine the political division theory, which holds that the
reason for separating church and state is that religion based
political conflict is especially divisive. This Part will examine
9. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000bb-1 (2019).
10. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that the free
exercise clause outweighs the government interest in education).
11.
Humane Slaughter Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1902 (2018) (defining
“slaughtering in accordance with the ritual requirements of the Jewish faith”
and similar procedures prescribed by other faiths as “humane”
notwithstanding the general rule that humane slaughter of livestock requires
that the animals be stunned before “being shackled, hoisted, thrown, cast, or
cut”).
12. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014)
(claiming an exemption, under the RFRA, from the contraceptive coverage
mandate issued under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act).
13. See ANTHONY BRADNEY, LAW AND FAITH IN A SCEPTICAL AGE 34 (2009)
(“Special provisions with respect to religion can be justified on the grounds that
they help the State to accommodate the complex variety of views of the good
that exist within its borders”); REX AHDAR & IAN LEIGH, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN
THE LIBERAL STATE 110–11 (2d ed. 2013).
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the two main variations of the political division theory—the
“Civil Peace” and “Alienation” rationales—as well as the main
criticisms directed at them.
It is impossible to precisely define the threshold of validity
and persuasiveness a constitutional justification must pass in
order to be considered valid. Still, constitutional rationales for
non-establishment need to provide good answers to two central
questions. The first is what makes religion distinctive in a way
that warrants special state treatment. That is, the rationale
must explain why religion “deserves a level of legal protection
that most other human interests and activities do not receive.”14
For example, if I suggest that the distinctiveness of religion is
that it has psychologically pleasing rituals, it can be pointed out
that national culture or football leagues have many similar
rituals. It is not necessary to find an attribute that is unique to
religion; it is sufficient to identify a function or value that is
served by religion in a more effective or essential manner. The
second question arises if the answer to this first question is
plausible. In this case, the rationale must account for why this
distinctiveness calls for a specific type of non-establishment
regime. In the literature, these questions are encapsulated in
the two criteria of distinctiveness and cogency.15
In order for any justification to be clear, the nature of the
justification must be identified. Non-establishment is an
umbrella term for several distinct legal and political ideas.
Gideon Sapir identifies four distinct positions associated with
non-establishment: (1) strict interpretation; (2) neutrality
interpretation; (3) non-coercion interpretation; and (4) non-

14. Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in
Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 198 (1991).
15. Id. at 198–99.
The distinctiveness requirement demands that a rationale
identify something distinctive about religion that explains
why religion deserves a level of legal protection that most
other human interests and activities do not receive. . . .
Finally, a rationale must meet the cogency requirement. It
must credibly explain not only how religion is distinctive,
but how it is distinctive in a way that calls for a
constitutional principle forbidding governmental regulation
or interference in matters of religion. Id.
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institutionalization interpretation.16
Under strict interpretation, non-establishment requires
establishing a “secular public moral order.”17 This position
requires a hermetically sealed separation between religion and
state, with no government involvement in supporting or
endorsing any type of religious symbols or institutions. The
strict interpretation even forbids the government from an
“acknowledgment of religion.”18
The neutrality interpretation requires the state “to
minimize the extent to which it either encourages or discourages
religious belief or disbelief, practice or non-practice, observance
or nonobservance.”19 It follows that “religion is to be left as
wholly to private choice as anything can be.”20
Under the non-coercion interpretation, the “state may single
out religion in general or any religious denomination as more
valuable than other options. A state should not, however, take
action, or enact policy or law, that has the intention or effect of
coercing people to accept any specific religion or religion in
general.”21
The non-institutionalization interpretation does not
prohibit any government support, endorsement, or even
coercion. Instead, it prohibits religion from becoming part of the
government. The state may not integrate religious institutions
into its administration or legal system.22
These four ideas will be utilized when examining the
rationales of non-establishment.
A. The Civil Peace Rationale
The civil peace justification for the special treatment of
religion contains two basic assertions. The first is that religion
presents a serious and powerful source of social tension and
conflict. The second is that dealing with this tension requires
16. See Gidon Sapir, Religion and State—A Fresh Theoretical Start, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579, 587–93 (1999).
17. Id. at 588.
18. Id. at 592.
19. Id. at 588.
20. Id. at 588–89.
21. Id. at 590–91.
22. See Gidon, supra note 16, at 592.
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the non-establishment of religion.
This rationale is the most frequently articulated
justification for religious freedom and non-establishment in
American courts. For example, in a statement in Walz v. Tax
Commission of New York City,23 in which the Supreme Court
established that tax exemptions for religious buildings do not
violate the Establishment Clause, Justice Harlan wrote that,
“[w]hat is at stake” in the First Amendment’s religion clauses “is
preventing that kind and degree of government involvement in
religious life that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife
and frequently strain a political system to the breaking point.”24
This danger is not completely averted by acting according to a
principle of government neutrality which allows government
involvement which treats all religions equally. According to
Justice Harlan, “[a]lthough the very fact of neutrality may limit
the intensity of involvement, government participation in
certain programs, whose very nature is apt to entangle the state
in details of administration and planning, may escalate to the
point of inviting undue fragmentation.”25 Justice Harlan also
joined Justice Goldberg’s concurring opinion in Schempp v.
Abington School District,26 wherein Goldberg stated that
instituting bible readings in public schools crosses into “the
realm of the sectarian as to give rise to those very divisive
influences and inhibitions of freedom which both religion clauses
of the First Amendment preclude.”27 Similar language is used
by Justice Black in a passionate dissent in Board of Education
of Central School District No.1 v. Allen,28 in which the Supreme
Court allowed school boards to let students from parochial
schools borrow books at no cost, where he argues that
To authorize a State to tax its residents for such
church purposes is to put the State squarely in the
religious activities of certain religious groups that
happen to be strong enough politically to write
their own religious preferences and prejudices
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

397 U.S. 664 (1970).
Id. at 694 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 695.
374 U.S. 203 (1963).
Id. at 307 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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into the laws. This links state and churches
together in controlling the lives and destinies of
our citizenship—a citizenship composed of people
of myriad religious faiths, some of them bitterly
hostile to and completely intolerant of the
others.29
In Black’s opinion, the profusion of faiths among the citizen
body and the potential antagonism among faiths makes any
movement towards establishment fraught with peril. Here, he
finds the grounding rationale of the Establishment Clause:
The First Amendment’s prohibition against
governmental establishment of religion was
written on the assumption that state aid to
religion and religious schools generates discord,
disharmony, hatred, and strife among our people,
and that any government that supplies such aids
is to that extent a tyranny. And I still believe that
the only way to protect minority religious groups
from majority groups in this country is to keep the
wall of separation between church and state high
and impregnable as the First and Fourteenth
Amendments provide. The Court’s affirmance
here bodes nothing but evil to religious peace in
this country.30
Writing in the majority opinion in Lemon v. Kurtzman,31 in
which the Court found that state funding for secular education
which takes place in religious schools violates the First
Amendment, Chief Justice Burger developed the civil peace
justification further. In the case, Burger offers the threepronged Lemon test for deciding whether a government act
violates the Establishment Clause: (1) does the statute have a
secular purpose?; (2) does the statute serve to primarily advance
or inhibit religion?; and (3) will the statute result in an

29. Id. at 251 (Black, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 254.
31. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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“excessive government entanglement” with religion?32 The civil
peace rationale is integrated into the entanglement prong of the
Lemon test. Whenever a state action towards a religion has
“divisive political potential,”33 it constitutes excessive
entanglement and is thus unconstitutional. Chief Justice
Burger further argues that state funding of religious schools
poses a significant risk of divisiveness. According to him, this
type of educational program will inevitably promote political
involvement in response to religious pressures:
Partisans of parochial schools, understandably
concerned with rising costs and sincerely
dedicated to both the religious and secular
educational missions of their schools, will
inevitably champion this cause and promote
political action to achieve their goals. Those who
oppose state aid, whether for constitutional,
religious, or fiscal reasons, will inevitably respond
and employ all of the usual political campaign
techniques to prevail. Candidates will be forced
to declare, and voters to choose.34
Here the unique nature of religious beliefs become pertinent:
Ordinarily political debate and division, however
vigorous or even partisan, are normal and healthy
manifestations of our democratic system of
government, but political division along religious
lines was one of the principal evils against which
the First Amendment was intended to protect.
The potential divisiveness of such conflict is a
threat to the normal political process.35
The idea of divisiveness remained a key concern of the Court’s
establishment jurisprudence for at least a decade following

32.
33.
34.
35.

See id.
Id. at 622.
Id.
Id.
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Lemon.36
More recently, the civil peace rationale provided the basis
for Justice Breyer’s dissent in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.37 The
majority opinion held that a school voucher program in Ohio did
not violate the Establishment Clause. Although Breyer joined
in the dissenting opinion of Justice Souter, Breyer wrote
separately in order “to emphasize the risk that public voucher
programs pose in terms of religiously based social conflict.”38 He
did so because he believed “that the Establishment Clause
concern for protecting the Nation’s social fabric from religious
conflict poses an overriding obstacle to the implementation of
this well-intentioned school voucher program.”39 Explaining the
centrality of the civil peace rationale to the 20th century Court’s
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, he starts by suggesting
that “[t]he Court appreciated the religious diversity of
contemporary American Society.”40 He also expresses his
understanding that the “status quo favored some religions at the
expense of others,” and understanding the “Establishment
Clause to prohibit (among other things) any such favoritism.”41
The reason this prohibition entails strong separation, and not a
regime of equal treatment, is due the historical lessons that
“show that efforts to obtain equivalent funding for the private
education of children whose parents did not hold popular
religious beliefs only exacerbated religious strife . . . .”42 A
governmental school voucher program, under conditions of
intense religious diversity, would necessarily cause political
conflict among different religious groups which would naturally
have divergent concerns over the implementation of such a
program. If so, “how is the State to resolve the resulting
controversies without provoking legitimate fears of the kinds of
religious favoritism that, in so religiously diverse a Nation,
threaten social dissension?” Since it is likely that a government
cannot successfully meet such a challenge, “the Court has

36. See Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment,
94 GEO. L. J. 1667, 1692 (2005).
37. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
38. Id. at 717 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 721.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 722.
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recognized that we must rely on the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment to protect against religious strife.” As the scholar
Michael Garnett has explained, for Breyer, the
[I]dentification, prevention, and elimination of
“religious strife” are integral parts of the Court’s
interpretive, expositive, and enforcement tasks.
That is, the construction of a “social fabric” free of
“religiously based social conflict” is more than a
desirable result of obeying and enforcing our
Constitution’s no-establishment command—it is
the command itself.43
The scholarly arguments mustered in support of the civil
peace rationale can be divided into two types. The first type of
argument deals with the nature of religious belief systems.
These beliefs “involve the deepest questions of self and spirit”
and rely on a “suppression of doubt.”44 That is, they “reject
reason’s authority in principle,” which makes them “less subject
to persuasion.”45 Because religious beliefs are often based on
sources that are unquestionably authoritative for adherents,
such as revelation, the moral force of these sources is so great
that they resist compromise, regardless of the consequences.
The combination of the rejection of reason and the inability to
compromise “threatens to disrupt political processes when it is
not only uncompromising but undiscussable and, from a secular
standpoint, radically arbitrary.”46 It follows that religious
conflicts are harder to resolve because the sides have a harder
time discussing, negotiating, and reaching a modus vivendi.
The second type of argument deals with the nature of a
religious community as an all-encompassing cultural group.
Such a cultural group
[C]overs various important aspects of life: it
defines
people’s
activities . . .
determines
43. Garnett, supra note 36, at 1674.
44. Ira C. Lupu, To Control Faction and Protect Liberty: A General Theory
of the Religion Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 357, 360 (1996).
45. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Madison’s Wager: Religious Liberty in the
Constitutional Order, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 347, 372 (1995).
46. Id. at 373.
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occupations . . .
and
defines
important
relationships . . . . It affects everything people do:
cooking, architectural style, common language,
literary and artistic traditions, music, customs,
dress, festivals, and ceremonies. . . . The culture
influences its members’ taste, the types of options
they have and the meaning of these options, and
the characteristics they consider significant in
their evaluation of themselves and others.47
The nature of religious belief operates as the unifying logic of the
religious community as an encompassing cultural group. It
creates a common language and provides common assumptions
that both unite the religious community and isolate it from the
rest of the polity. This means that the divisive potential of
religion is relatively high.
How do these two types of arguments support the separation
of religion from state? In applying the civil peace rationale to
the context of non-establishment, Kent Greenwalt argues that
“[i]nevitably, some tensions will exist between adherents of
different religions who believe each other to be fundamentally
misguided about ultimate truth. But the tensions are bound to
increase if those adherents see themselves in a struggle for state
support—financial and other—and for the levers of political
power.”48 Thus, the elimination through neutrality or a strict
version of non-establishment limiting the ability of religious
groups to compete over state power is the goal of the separation
of church and state. This logic is complemented by the idea that
granting a wide array of religious freedoms and exemptions
generally minimizes the area of friction between the state and
religion. Non-establishment eliminates one of the most crucial
issues religious groups can fight about with each other and with
the state, and religious freedom eliminates many of the causes
of religious friction with the state. Thus, concern over the
divisive and potentially threatening nature of conflicts between
religious groups and the state justify a prudentially established
combination of religious freedoms and non-establishment.
47. Avishai Margalit & Moshe Halbertal, Liberalism and the Right to
Culture, 61 SOC. RES. 491, 498 (1994).
48.
2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION:
ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS 11 (2009).
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Debunking the Civil Peace Rationale

The first criticism of the civil peace rationale for nonestablishment is that there is no reason to believe that religion,
as a general category, is especially divisive. That is, the civil
peace rationale does not meet the distinctiveness requirement,
as it is unclear why divisions or conflicts based on religion are
“worse than divisions along the lines of race, gender, age,
ethnicity, or economic class.”49
In order to distinguish between religion as a general
category and these other sources of social conflict, it must be
established that religion is an especially significant cause of
conflict. This seems to be historically implausible, at least in the
case of the United States. As Michael Smith argues, “[o]ur most
divisive social issues since the constitutional revolution of 1937
have included the completion of industrial unionization in the
late 1930s; McCarthyism in the early 1950s; the campaign for
racial equality from the middle 1950s onward; prolongation of
the Vietnam War; and perhaps the Watergate scandal.”50
Indeed, even putting aside this strong historical counterfactual
evidence, there remains the strong conceptual problem that the
characterization of religious belief upon which the civil peace
rationale apparently relies is not necessarily accurate and may
not even represent a reasonable supposition. Many religions
accept that fallibility and self-deception are mainstays of human
existence. Some reject revelation and see religious value in
human reason and lived experience. For this reason, many
liberal religious denominations do not seem more or less
intolerant than their secular counterparts.51 Consequently, it is
difficult to support the distinctiveness of the civil peace
challenge of religion as a general category.
Even if we do accept that religion causes civil strife in a way
that warrants special status, it does not follow that the
appropriate treatment must be strong forms of nonestablishment. Indeed, Ahdar and Leigh support this argument,
49. Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment
Clause, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831, 1838 (2009).
50. Michael E. Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution,
1983 SUP. CT. REV. 83, 97 (1983).
51. Sapir, supra note 16, at 595–96.
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claiming that a society in which “a few, more-or-less equal-sized
religions dominate the landscape is a situation tailor-made for a
policy of religious tolerance.”52 However,
[A] nation where one religion is dominant (with,
say, 90 percent adherence) may not need to
placate the minority religions by adopting a policy
of toleration. If the minority faiths are disruptive,
militant ones, toleration may still be prudent; but
if the minority religions are quiet, pacifist and
powerless, suppression may pose few, if any,
problems.53
Similarly, Michael Sandel points out that “under present
conditions, such calculations [about how to avoid civil strife] may
or may not support the separation of church and state . . . . A
strict separation of church and state may at times provoke more
strife that it prevents.”54 That is, there are circumstances in
which civil peace may not warrant even a weaker, non-coercive,
interpretation of non-establishment.
These powerful critiques reflect why the vast majority of the
scholars criticize the Court’s use of the divisiveness/civil peace
test. When it is applied to religion as a general category, it fails
to persuade that religion is especially divisive in light of
historical evidence to the contrary, thus failing to meet the
distinctiveness criteria. Even if this failure is overcome and
religion is considered divisive, non-establishment may not
necessarily alleviate the problem, thereby not meeting the
cogency criteria. Non-establishment may, in fact, make the
problem much worse.
Closely related to the civil peace rationale is the
nonalienation rationale.

B. The Nonalienation Rationale
52. AHDAR & LEIGH, supra note 13, at 71.
53. Id.
54. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF
A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 64 (1998).
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Even if the premise that religion as a general category is so
socially disruptive that it may seriously threaten the political
order, the possibility that the establishment of religion may
cause milder political harm must still be considered. One such
harm that has received increased attention in recent decades is
the danger of establishment creating increased political
alienation among non-adherents. In the United States, this
rationale is usually associated with Justice O’Connor’s
development of what is called the endorsement test. In her
concurrence in County of Allegheny v. ACLU,55 Justice O’Connor
argues that an endorsement of religion
[S]ends a message to non-adherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community. Disapproval
of religion conveys the opposite message. . . . We
live in a pluralistic society. Our citizens come
from diverse religious traditions or adhere to no
particular religious beliefs at all. If government
is to be neutral in matters of religion, rather than
showing either favoritism or disapproval towards
citizens based on their personal religious choices,
government cannot endorse the religious practices
and beliefs of some citizens without sending a
clear message to non-adherents that they are
outsiders or less than full members of the political
community. An Establishment Clause standard
that prohibits only “coercive” practices or overt
efforts at government proselytization . . . but fails
to take account of the numerous more subtle ways
that government can show favoritism to
particular beliefs or convey a message of
disapproval to others, would not, in my view,
adequately protect the religious liberty or respect
the religious diversity of the members of our

55. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).

19

418

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 40.1

pluralistic political community.56
In this case, the Court appears to be concerned that any
establishment or endorsement of a religion by the state will
harm religious minorities and secular citizens, whose “faith will
not be the one that the government observes and whose symbols
will not be displayed.”57 That is, endorsement is a symbol that
the state deems some religious group more “worthy” than others,
which could lead to some citizens seeing “themselves as
demeaned and excluded by state institutions . . . .” As a result,
“they might physically withdraw from such institutions, come to
feel alienated from such institutions.”58 The nonalienation
rationale, then, supports strict non-establishment.
In order to find that the nonalienation rationale provides
plausible support for non-establishment, the distinctiveness
criteria must be met. The idea here is that religious identity and
affiliation are a “core part of one’s sense of self. Other mutable
attributes, such as political affiliation, are generally viewed as
more tangential and ephemeral.”59 The centrality of religion
means that the stakes of being “within or without” religious
membership, “can be very high: being fulfilled and redeemed or
eternally damned; being welcomed as a member of the
community or shunned.”60 These stakes lie at the core of the
concern with the government favoring religious beliefs “at the
cost of disparaging others, and further, that the . . . government
will valorize some citizens at the cost of disparaging others.”61 If
the idea that endorsement of religion as a general category leads
to especially high levels of alienation is accepted, it can be
cogently concluded that strict non-establishment will solve this
problem.

56. Id. at 625–28 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part).
57. 1 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: OVERVIEWS & HISTORY 39
(2010).
58. Daniel Brudney, On Noncoercive Establishment, 33 POL. THEORY 812,
819 (2005).
59. Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres:
The Fragmentation and Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and Speech in the
Constitution, 51 OHIO ST. L. J. 89, 147 (1990).
60. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 61–62 (2007).
61. Id. at 62.
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Debunking the Nonalienation Rationale

The fundamental critique of the civil peace rationale as it
applies to religion as a general category is similar to that applied
to the nonalienation rationale. This leads to the question of
whether endorsement of religion rises to the level of uniqueness
in creating alienation among citizens, which seems difficult to
establish affirmatively. To plausibly meet the uniqueness
criteria, we must accept that religion is generally more central
for peoples’ relationship to the state than are their national
identity or values. Consequently, the state’s endorsement of a
religion would alienate more citizens or alienate them in a more
radical way than would the state’s endorsement or promotion of
views that conflict with that religion’s morality or group
identity. While this premise may apply to a minority of citizens
holding strong or fundamentalist religious views, it does not
necessarily apply to a majority of religious adherents.
Even if the distinctiveness of religion in relation to the
nonalienation rationale is accepted, the question remains as to
whether non-establishment would lead to less alienation
generally. The evidence indicates otherwise. Many nonestablishment cases are so controversial that it makes it hard to
argue that they necessarily, or possibly, reduce citizen
alienation.
Although nonalienation is related to the civil peace
rationale, it appears to lack the self-evident sense of importance
found in the civil peace rationale.
It seems clear that
maintaining political stability and preventing serious political
strife is a meaningful goal. It is not so clear that preventing
citizens from being alienated by political decisions rises to this
level. Indeed, it seems that in “a pluralistic culture, alienation
is inevitable.”62 Therefore, it appears that some beliefs and
values can be included in a nation’s laws and policy,
notwithstanding any religious content. The fact that those who
do not like these beliefs and values may well feel somewhat like
outsiders63 is not sufficient to justify applying non-establishment
measures.
62. Koppelman, supra note 49, at 1840.
63. See Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions:
Establishment Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266
(1987).

21

420

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 40.1

To conclude, we find that the civil peace and alienation
rationales fail in both the distinctiveness and cogency
requirements when applied to religion as a general category.
The reason for this is perhaps the sheer scope of phenomena
covered by the general category of religion. The question then
arises as to what would happen if these rationales were applied
to a distinct, but related, subcategory such as religious
nationality.
III. American Religious Nationality
A. Civic and Religious Nationality
The modern nation-state is expansive, its reach
encompassing every aspect of social, economic, and political
life.64 The stability and effectiveness of a state in its national
form is contingent on its capacity to maintain sovereignty over a
geographic territory.65 This implies the supremacy of the state
over other normative structures and power centers. Indeed, a
state can be defined by its ability to constrain other potential
wielders of authority and power. For the state to be able to
constantly maintain this monopoly, it must be considered
legitimate by the citizen body. That is, the state is reliant on the
set of beliefs, myths, and ideas that enable its citizens to
recognize that state power is a force to which they should
adhere.66 In nation-states, whether liberal or not, the ideologies
64. See generally GRAEME GILL, THE NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
MODERN STATE (2016) (reviewing the literature dealing with the attributes of
the modern nation state).
65. Id. at 5.
The modern state is sovereign, or the ultimate source of
authority within the territory under its jurisdiction . . . .
Internally, it means that there are no authorities higher than
the state. The citizen cannot appeal against the state to any
other authority; the state is supreme, and its will cannot be
countermanded . . . . Externally, state sovereignty means
that other states recognize the authority of a state within its
borders and accept that that state can speak for its citizens
in international affairs. Id. at 8–9.
66. This idea of legitimacy is broadly based on the idea of constitutional
legitimacy found in CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 8 (Jeffrey Seitzer
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explaining and justifying state power can be termed nationality.
Nationality, understood as a comprehensive category
including both civic and religious nationality, is an ideology of
order which joins “state, territory[,] and culture.”67 According to
Anthony Giddens, nationality is the “cultural sensibility of
sovereignty.”68 This implies, in part, that the ideology of
nationality includes an “awareness of being subject to authority
invested with the power of life and death.”69 It is such an
ideology which enables the state to hold the monopoly over the
“legitimate use of physical force”70 within a given territory. A
state is a political body which is sovereign over a territory, which
differs analytically from the concept of a nation. A nation is a
type of community which can either support the sovereignty of
an existing state or promote a political program of the nation
achieving sovereignty over a territory.71 The development of a
sense of national unity is a key part of any project of nationbuilding. Historically, the emergence of such “imagined national
communities”72 across the world marked the “shift from dynastic
realm to national state.”73 When and where national identity
and ideology are successfully integrated into the political realm,
they become unquestionable assumptions for a large majority of
citizens.
These definitions do not address the content of the
narratives through which the connections among nation,
ed., trans., 2d ed. 2008) (1928) (stating “legitimacy is obtained only through
the representation of the unified will or the historical existence of the people”).
67. Roger Friedland, Money, Sex, and God: The Erotic Logic of Religious
Nationalism, 20 SOC. THEORY 381, 387 (2002).
68. 2 ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE NATION-STATE AND VIOLENCE 219 (1985).
69. MARK JUERGENSMEYER, THE NEW COLD WAR? RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM
CONFRONTS THE SECULAR STATE 32 (1993).
70. Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in WEBER’S RATIONALISM AND
MODERN SOCIETY: NEW TRANSLATIONS ON POLITICS, BUREAUCRACY, AND SOCIAL
STRATIFICATION 9 (Tony Waters & Dagmar Waters eds., trans., 2015) (1946).
71. Many minority nationalist groups operate within a social and political
context of a separate majority nationality. That is, they have a national project
which is distinct from the one promoted by the state within which they operate.
See generally WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY
OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1995) (discussing the accommodation of such minority
national groups in liberal states).
72. See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON
THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALITY (Verso ed. 2006) (applying, first, the
concept of imagined communities to national groups).
73. GILL, supra note 64, at 102.
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territory, and culture are established and justified. It is this
open-ended nature of nationality which requires an additional
ideological element. What is it that connects a particular group
to a territory? What is the authority which justifies and
legitimates a nation-state? Both the civic and religious varieties
of nationality differ in their answers to these questions. I share
the theoretical position that nationality and religion74 are cut
74. That defining religion is hard is a fact both true and banal. However,
it is still important to offer a plausible working definition. Minimally then, we
can define religion as the human response to a reality perceived as sacred. It
grounds human experience in a reality which is beyond this world.
Maintaining this type of enterprise requires massive cultural support. It is
thus common to see religions embrace: (1) myths of the sacred origins of the
world, humanity, and the specific religion; (2) rituals and modes of worship
that relate the practitioners to the myths and the sacred; and (3) codes of
conduct which govern the behavior of those who belong to the religion. See
SCOTT R. APPLEBY, THE AMBIVALENCE OF THE SACRED: RELIGION, VIOLENCE, AND
RECONCILIATION 8–9 (1999). This type of description is suggestive of the
profound ways in which religion regulates, inspires, and influences human
society. One more important aspect is its ability to create order at the face of
anomic and chaotic human experience. Clifford Geertz, for example, sees
religion as attempting to give an ordered coherence to the utter chaos of
everyday reality; in fact, it is part of his definition of religion, which for him is:
“(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and
long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a
general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura
of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.”
Clifford Geertz, Religion as a Cultural System, in THE INTERPRETATION OF
CULTURES 90 (1993). The cosmic disorder can make sense when contrasted
with Divine order. In the words of Peter Berger, “the sacred cosmos, which
transcends and includes man in its ordering of reality, thus provides man its
ultimate shield against the terror of anomy.” PETER L. BERGER, THE SACRED
CANOPY: ELEMENTS OF A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF RELIGION 19 (2011). One can
divide the scholarship on the subject of the sacred into two wide tribes:
phenomenologists on the one hand and culturalists on the other. The first kind
examines the sacred as a basic structure of the human experience of the world.
The latter understands the sacred as an identifiable quality of social life. The
sacred is socially/culturally constructed within a specific historical context. See
generally GORDON LYNCH, THE SACRED IN THE MODERN WORLD: A CULTURAL
SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH (2012) (exploring the distinction between
phenomenologists and culturalists). William James, Rudolf Otto, and Mircea
Eliade are good representations of phenomenologists. Otto defines the sacred
as the experience of mysterium tremendum et fascinans (“overwhelming and
fascinating mystery”); for him the holy constitutes a category of interpretation
and valuation peculiar to the sphere of religion. See generally RUDOLF OTTO,
THE IDEA OF THE HOLY (1958). For Eliade, sacred time, space, and things
represent a more intense “reality” around which the rest of the human world
is structured. See generally MIRCEA ELIADE, THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE:
THE NATURE OF RELIGION (1959). On the side of the culturalists we can find
Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, and Peter Berger. Durkheim divides human life
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from a similar cloth75 and will follow Mark Juergensmeyer’s
view that both religion and nationality are ideologies of order.
By this I mean that they are both frameworks that conceive
[Of the] world in coherent, manageable ways; they
both suggest that there are levels of meaning
beneath the day-to-day world that give coherence
to things unseen; and they both provide the
authority that gives the social and political order
its reason for being. In doing so they define for the
individual the right way of being in the world and
relate persons to the social whole.76
This view rejects the conception of the state as merely a
form of social contract or purely democratic institution, and
replaces it with the idea of a community grounded on a system
of faith. A prominent adherent to this view, Anthony Smith,
asserts that nationality is a system of faith as “binding, ritually

into two symbolic realms: sacred and profane. The latter is the realm of routine
experience that we can know through our senses. We experience this natural
world of everyday life as comprehensible, knowable and taken-for-granted.
The sacred, in contrast, is separated from everyday experience; it is an object
of worship, inspiring feelings of awe among its believers. Durkheim believes
that the sacred is a socially constructed symbolic representation of society
itself. See generally EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE
RELIGIOUS LIFE (2008). Berger represents the most sophisticated version of
sacred culturalism. He elaborates the idea, stating that religion is the human
enterprise by which a sacred social world is established. PETER L. BERGER, THE
SACRED CANOPY: ELEMENTS OF A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF RELIGION (1967).
Since the sacred exists beyond the everyday, but is still experienced through
rituals and symbols, it is experienced as both being independent of humanity
and yet being accessible. The sacred social world is constructed on the
concreteness of sacred social institutions. My approach to the sacred is
culturalist and is roughly based on Berger’s idea.
75. For different variations on this idea, see EMILE DURKHEIM, THE
ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE 419 (2008) (“If religion has given
birth to all that is essential in society, it is because the idea of society is the
soul of religion”). See generally CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR
CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (George Schwab trans., Univ. Chi.
Press ed. 1985) (1888) (“All significant concepts of the modern theory of the
state are secularized theological concepts”); Rogers Brubaker, Religion and
Nationality: Four Approaches, 18 NATIONS & NATIONALISM 2 (2012) (discussing
the different ways of understanding the relationship of religion and
nationality).
76. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 69, at 31.

25

424

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 40.1

repetitive, and collectively enthusing” as any other.77 It also
involves a “system of beliefs and practices that distinguishes the
sacred from the profane and unites its adherents in a single
moral community of the faithful.”78 As Juergensmeyer explains,
both religion and nationality “are expressions of faith, both
involve an identity with a loyalty to a large community, and both
insist on the ultimate moral legitimacy of the authority invested
in the leadership of the community.”79 It does not follow that
religious nationality, as it is defined herein, is identical to civic
nationality. Rather, the differences between religious and civic
nationality are comparable to the differences between different
members of the same species, as opposed to the differences
between completely alien entities.
In the United States today, civic nationality and religious
nationality are the two main narrative variants through which
territory, state, and culture are connected. Civic nationality
justifies government acts and policies on the basis of the
interests, values, and civic political institutions of “the people.”
The American people are called to sacrifice in Afghanistan and
Iraq purportedly in order to promote their democratic values and
protect the United States from terrorism. The people are also
seen as constituting the intrinsic, fundamental authority for the
United States Constitution.80 In the United States, it is
commonly understood that the binding agent of “the people” are
civic institutions. Civic, or liberal, nationality “locates the
nation as a group of citizens, each of whom bear, and have a
history of exercising, the same legal rights vis-à-vis the state.”81
According to religious nationality, the ultimate provider of
meaning is not the people but the Divine. The popular sovereign
is meaningful only inasmuch as it has a crucial role in the Divine
plan. For Christian nationality, the story of the American people
is not merely one of national liberation from oppressors and
77. ANTHONY D. SMITH, CHOSEN PEOPLES: SACRED SOURCES OF NATIONAL
4–5 (2003).
78. Id. at 4–5, 15.
79. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 69, at 16.
80. See generally 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS
(1998) (showing how the American people have repeatedly confronted the
Constitution in the name of the popular sovereign); PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN
OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA (1997)
(analyzing the idea that the rule of law is rule of the people).
81. Friedland, supra note 67, at 387.
IDENTITY
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subsequent self-definition but is another step in the fulfillment
of the Divine plan on earth. Consequently, religious nationality
holds that religion is the distinguishing and defining
characteristic of the nation and the State.82 They believe that
the fundamental authority of state power is “derived from divine
sources, not from the historical decisions of a particular
people.”83
Finally, according to adherents on religious
nationality, the state has a crucial role in the Divine plan or
process. For them, national politics are a Divine command.84
Not all forms of political religion constitute religious
nationality. Religious nationality includes only those religious
movements that view the state not solely as a political
instrument but rather as a crucial part of their religion. In the
words of Roger Friedland:
Religious nationalisms are a particular form of
politicized religion, that is religious movements
that engage in political projects that make the
state not only a medium, but an object, of
collective action. The specificity of their project is
located in their desire to transform the nature of
the nation-state itself. They all seek to make
religion the nation-state’s institutional ground.85
Historically, American civic nationality incorporates and
supports the two major concepts of liberal secularism and civil
religion with regard to the relationship of politics and religion.
Philip Gorski presents this conceptual triangle: “religious
nationalists wish the boundaries of the religious and political
communities to be as coterminous as possible; liberal secularists
seek to keep the religious and political communities as separate
82. Roger Friedland & Kenneth B. Moss, Thinking Through Religious
Nationalism, in WORDS: RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE MATTERS 423, 449 (Ernst Van
Den Hemel & Asja Szafraniec eds., 2016) (stating “[a]t its most basic, religion
constitutes the ‘we’ of the nation-state”).
83. Id. at 450.
84. Id. at 449 (stating “the nation itself can have religious meaning if its
constitution, survival, and actions are understood to have redemptive or
soteriological significance”).
85. Roger Friedland, The Institutional Logic of Religious Nationalism:
Sex, Violence and the Ends of History, 12 POL., RELIGION & IDEOLOGY 1, 2
(2011).
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as possible; and civil religionists imagine the two spheres as
independent but interconnected.”86 Let us now turn to an
examination of American civil religion, which will lay the
groundwork for understanding Christian nationality.
B. American Civil Religion
It is true that not all politicized religion constitutes religious
nationality. However, at least in the American case, the
acceptability and centrality of politicized religion within civic
nationality has made the political ascendance of Christian
nationality possible. This section will focus on how the
prevailing civil religion in the United States prepared the
ground for the emergence of Christian nationality. What
emerges from this examination is the understanding that the
political and cultural centrality of the civil religion’s stance that
politics and religion are interrelated serves to legitimize and
enable the belief that politics and religion are one and the same.
As Robert Bellah described, there “exists alongside of and
rather clearly differentiated from the churches an elaborate and
well-institutionalized civil religion in America.”87 This civil
religion has its own set of beliefs, which is maintained and
developed by various rituals and folk practices. The civil religion
also employs narratives which are drawn from Christianity, but
which operate independently from these origins. According to
Bellah, behind the American civil religion lie, “biblical
archetypes: Exodus, Chosen People, Promised Land, New
Jerusalem, and Sacrificial Death and Rebirth.”88 However, civil
religion uses these symbolic structures to produce “its own
prophets and its own martyrs, its own sacred events and sacred
places, its own solemn rituals and symbols.”89 The central tenet
of American civil religion is that God has a unique plan and place
for the United States.
The religious and biblical interpretation of American
history can be traced back to the start of the first European
86.

PHILIP GORSKI, AMERICAN COVENANT: A HISTORY OF CIVIL RELIGION
PURITANS TO THE PRESENT 7 (2017).
87. Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, 96 DAEDALUS: J. AM.
ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 1, 1 (1988).
88. Id. at 21.
89. Id.
FROM THE
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colonies in North America. The early settlers saw their journey
as a mission to establish a perfect Christian polity. They
believed that, like the ancient Israelites, they were called by God
to be a light onto the nations.90 In a sermon composed while
sailing towards New England, John Winthrop, one of the
founders of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, declared that upon
arrival, “[w]e shall find that the God of Israel is among us,” and,
as a result
[W]e must consider that we shall be as a city upon
a hill. The eyes of all people are upon us. So that
if we shall deal falsely with our God in this work
we have undertaken, and so cause Him to
withdraw His present help from us, we shall be
made a story and a by-word through the world.”91
In a sermon before a Hartford Congregation in the 17th
century, Reverend Samuel Wakeman proclaimed that,
“Jerusalem was, New England is. They were, you are . . . God’s
covenant people.”92
The Israelites were, for the New
Englanders, a model to both emulate and transcend. The
colonists viewed the newly colonized continent as uniquely
appropriate for establishing New Jerusalem and bringing about
redemption. The theologian Jonathan Edwards declared that
the new continent was discovered so “that the new and most
glorious state of God’s church on earth might commence there;
that God might in it begin a new world in a spiritual respect,
when he creates the new heavens and new earth.”93 For
Edwards, Christ’s reign was bound to “begin in America”
because when God returns, he is likely to wish to start anew:
“[w]hen God is about to turn the earth into a paradise, he does
not begin his work where there is some growth already, but in

90. CONRAD CHERRY, GOD’S NEW ISRAEL: RELIGIOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF
AMERICAN DESTINY 27 (1998) (“They believed that, like Israel of old, they had
been singled out by God to be an example for the nations (especially for
England).”).
91. John Winthrop, A Model of Christian Charity, WINTHROP SOCIETY,
https://www.winthropsociety.com/doc_charity.php (last visited Nov. 9, 2019).
92. SACVAN BERCOVITCH, THE PURITAN ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN SELF 61
(1975).
93. CHERRY, supra note 90, at 55–56.
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the wilderness.”94 Edwards saw the old world as the place of
Christ’s crucifixion, and thus “shall not have the honour of
communicating religion in its most glorious state to us, but we
to them.” Furthermore, the fact that “America was discovered
about the time of the Reformation” was no coincidence for
Edwards, but rather a sign that the redemption would start in
the New World.95 By citing from the book of Isaiah, Edwards
concluded that “the progression of God’s Kingdom had always
been from east to west: first from Israel to Rome, and now from
Rome to America.”96
The American War of Independence, the establishment of
the United States, and the creation of the Constitution became
the founding events of the civil religion of the United States. In
a sermon entitled “A Sermon on the Commencement of the
Constitution,” given in 1789, the clergyman Samuel Cooper
details the “striking resemblance” between the circumstances of
the new and unique state and “those of the ancient Israelites.”97
Like the Israelites, “we rose from oppression”; like them, “we
were led into a wilderness, as a refuge from tyranny”; like them,
“we have been pursued through the sea”; like them, “we have
been ungrateful to the Supreme Ruler of the world” and have
been accordingly punished.98
However, this “day, this
memorable day, is a witness, that the Lord, he whose hand
maketh great, and giveth strength unto all, hath not forsaken
us, nor our God forgotten us.”99 In a similar vein, the 18th
century clergyman and former president of Harvard University
Samuel Langdon stated that this “excellent constitution of
government” was given by “God in the course of his kind
providence.”100 The colonists’ perception of themselves as New
Israel became sharper during and after the revolution. King
94. Id. at 55–56.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. A Sermon on the Commencement of the Constitution, TEACHING
AMERICAN HISTORY, https://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/asermon-on-the-commencement-of-the-constitution/ (last visited Dec 29, 2019).
98. Id.
99. ELLIS SANDOZ, POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA
1730–1805: IN TWO VOLUMES 631 (2012).
100. Samuel Langdon, Political Sermon at Exeter, New Hampshire: The
Republic of the Israelites: An Example To The American States (June 5, 1788),
https://www.consource.org/document/the-republic-of-the-israelites-anexample-to-the-american-states-by-samuel-langdon-1788-6-5/.
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George III was cast in the role of Pharaoh, the Atlantic Ocean as
the Red Sea, George Washington as Moses, and John Adams as
Joshua. In fact, Langdon went so far as to suggest that “instead
of the twelve tribes of Israel, we may substitute the thirteen
states of the American union.”101 For Ezra Stiles, the former
president of Yale College, the establishment of the United States
was a crucial event in the progression of Christianity. In a
sermon before the Connecticut Assembly, Stiles maintained that
all attempts of converting the world to Christianity “shall prove
fruitless, until the present Christendom itself be recovered to
primitive purity and simplicity.”102 It is God’s design that
[C]hristianity is to be found in such great purity,
in this church exiled into the wilderness of
America; and that its purest body should be
evidently advancing forward, by an augmented
natural increase and spiritual edification, into a
singular
superiority—with
the
ultimate
subserviency to the glory of God, in converting the
world.103
The belief in the new nation’s Divine narrative was not
limited to men of the cloth. When Congress directed John
Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and Thomas Jefferson to design a
seal for the new state, Franklin suggested the image of “Moses
lifting his hand and the Red Sea dividing, with Pharaoh in his
chariot being overwhelmed by the waters,”104 and with a motto
in great popular favor at the time, “[r]ebellion to tyrants is
obedience to God.”105 Jefferson proposed “a representation of the
children of Israel in the wilderness, led by a cloud by day and
pillar of fire by night.”106 In fact, Jefferson concluded his second
inaugural address with the words, “I shall need . . . the favor of

101. Id.
102. Ezra Stiles, Political Sermon at the General Assembly of the State
of Connecticut: The United States Elevated to Glory and Honor 57 (1783),
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1041&context=eta
s.
103. Id.
104. CHERRY, supra note 90, at 65.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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that Being in whose hands we are, who led our fathers, as Israel
of old, from their native land and planted them in a country
flowing with all the necessaries and comforts of life.”107 For
Americans at that time, the American Revolution was the era in
which God had delivered the colonies from Britain (Pharaoh),108
revealed the role of the nation in the Divine plan, and
established the fledgling republic as an example of freedom and
republican government for the rest of the world to see.
In subsequent decades, the expansion westward and the
sheer magnitude and wealth of the newly settled land reinforced
the idea that Americans had been chosen by God.109 It is during
these early years of growth that the term Manifest Destiny
became popular. As Albert Weinberg describes it, Manifest
Destiny “expressed a dogma of supreme self-assurance and
ambition—that America’s incorporation of all adjacent lands
was the virtually inevitable fulfillment of a moral mission
delegated to the nation by Providence itself.”110 This was
justified and grounded in the idea that “nature or the natural
order of things destined natural boundaries for nations in
general and the United States, the nation of special destiny, in
particular.”111 Now, during this period of abundance, in contrast
to earlier manifestations, the reason for the Divine election of
the United States becomes clear: its geographic bounty, its

107. Id. at 65.
108. Id. at 69–70.
Thus we are acting over the like sins with the children of
Israel in the wilderness, under the conduct of Moses and
Aaron, who was leading them out of a state of bondage into a
land of liberty and plenty in Canaan. Again, we are ready to
marvel at the unreasonable vileness and cruelty of the
British tyrant and his ministry, in endeavouring to oppress,
enslave and destroy these American States, who have been
some of his most peaceable and profitable subjects. And yet
we find the same wicked temper and disposition operating in
Pharaoh king of Egypt above 3000 years ago. Id.
109. Id. at 113 (“The magnitude and rich natural resources of the western
American wilderness strengthened the conviction that Americans were the
chosen people. Surely this was a land intended for the new children of Israel.”).
110. Id. at 116.
111.
ALBERT KATZ WEINBERG, MANIFEST DESTINY: A STUDY OF
NATIONALIST EXPANSIONISM IN AMERICAN HISTORY 1–2, 43 (1935).
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superior government, and its moral goodness.112
The second foundational moment of American civil religion
is clearly the American Civil War. Both the Union and the
Confederacy identified their causes with American Divine
destiny. In the North, for example, the clergyman Henry Ward
Beecher described the war as a fight against Satan: “I thank [the
Confederacy] that they took another flag to do the Devil’s work
and left our flag to do the work of God.”113 At the same time, in
the South, many religious leaders argued that slavery was
ordained by God, and “the abolition spirit is undeniably
atheistic,” thus, “we defend the cause of God and religion.”114
While many interpreted the war as a fight between good and
evil, some, such as Abraham Lincoln, saw it as a sign of Divine
punishment for the entire nation. As Lincoln wrote in a personal
note late in 1862, “[i]n the present civil war it is quite possible
that God’s purpose is something different from the purpose of
either party—and yet the human instrumentalities, working
just as they do, are of the best adaptation to effect His
purpose.”115
Similar ideas suffuse American political discourse to this
day. As the historian Conrad Cherry observed
Beheld from the angle of governing mythology, the
history of the American civil religion is a history
of the conviction that the American people are
God’s New Israel, his newly chosen people. The
belief that America has been elected by God for a
special destiny in the world has been the focus of
American sacred ceremonies, the inaugural
addresses of our presidents, the sacred scriptures
of the civil religion. It has been so pervasive a
motif in the national life that the word “belief”
does not really capture the dynamic role that it
has played for the American people, for it passed
112. CHERRY, supra note 90, at 117 (“According to the exponents of
Manifest Destiny, God’s New Israel was elected for clear or manifest reasons—
because of its superior form of government, its geographical location, and its
beneficence.”)
113. Id. at 164.
114. Id. at 165.
115. Id. at 166.
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into “the realm of motivational myths.”116
The conviction that America has a divine destiny, and the
strong analogy with the ancient Israelites, does not mean that
American civil religion constitutes Christian nationality.
Adopting Gorski’s approach presented above, religious
nationalist views call for a unification of politics and religion,
while civil religion considers politics and religions to be simply
somewhat connected spheres. It is possible to believe that the
United States has been transported through history on the
wings of providential eagles, while at the same time thinking
that religion generally, and Christianity specifically, should
have nothing to do with politics. Nevertheless, some of the
thinkers discussed here as representing the tradition of
American civil religion do come very near religious nationalist
waters. For example, the belief of the early Puritans, many of
whom lived in theocratic colonies, that the Divine calling of the
New England colonies was to build a perfect Christian polity,
can clearly be characterized as religious nationalism in nature.
The close affinity between American civil religion and Christian
nationality underlies this Article’s argument that America’s civil
religion facilitated the emergence of a strong form of Christian
nationality, making it both familiar and legitimate. The idea
that Providence can be witnessed in action in the history of the
United States, a common trope of America’s civil religion, makes
the idea of the United States as a Christian nation less of a
radical leap. The next section will examine American Christian
nationality.
C. American Christian Nationality
Gorski views American Christian nationality as a “a toxic
blend of apocalyptic religion and imperial zeal that envisions the
United States as a righteous nation charged with a divine
commission to rid the world of evil and usher in the Second
Coming.”117
As discussed above, adherents of Christian
nationality see religion and politics as fused, with Christianity
and citizenship being closely aligned. According to Gorski,
116. Id. at 19.
117. GORSKI, supra note 86, at 2.
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American religious nationalist ideology is fueled by two biblical
narratives. The first is the conquest narrative, as it appears in
the biblical Prophets, in which the Israelites are commanded to
conquer the Land of Israel and in which the themes of bloody
war, animal sacrifice, and Divine interventions are rife.118 In
the Book of Numbers (33:53), the Israelites are commanded to
“[t]ake possession of the land and settle in it.”119 This directive
takes a bloodier turn in Deuteronomy (20:16) where they are
commanded to “not leave alive anything that breathes”120 in the
cities that God was giving them. The utter destruction of the
people inhabiting the land is justified by the need for religious
purity. If those inhabitants were to be kept alive, “they will
teach you to follow all the detestable things they do in
worshiping their gods, and you will sin against the Lord your
God.”121 The conquest narrative is one of holy war and
settlement expressed in the language of sacrifice and just wars.
The second Biblical narrative identified by Gorski as
foundational for American Christian nationality is apocalyptic,
and “conjures up visions of . . . the rapture such as one [found]
in the book of Daniel and the Revelation of John.”122 In this
narrative, the world is in a state of moral decline and natural
disasters are becoming increasingly frequent. This is the
background for an apocalyptic battle between “the forces of good
and evil,”123 which ultimately destroys the world. Finally,
“Christ swoops down from the sky, accompanied by the hosts of
heaven, to defeat the forces of evil and bind the power of
Satan.”124 American politics, understood apocalyptically, are a
stage for a cosmic showdown between God and Satan.
Although, as earlier discussed, religious nationalist ideology
has deep roots in American history, reaching back to the colonial
period, it did not gain significant political potency until the rise
of the Christian right in the latter half of the 20th century. It is
at this point that the narratives of apocalypse and conquest

118. Id. at 18–20 (describing the dynamic of conquest and apocalypse in
religious nationality).
119. Numbers 33:53.
120. Deuteronomy 20:16.
121. Deuteronomy 20:18.
122. GORSKI, supra note 86, at 19.
123. Id. at 22.
124. Id.
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combined to create a true Christian nationality in the United
States.
This Part’s goal is to show that modern American Christian
nationality is a qualitatively different ideology than former
religious political movements.125
As will be seen, the
foundations of this relatively new movement are vastly different
from the more benignly vague civil religious ideas of a
providential wind filling the sails of the American state,
replacing the ideology of civil religion with the belief that the
United States was, and is, a Christian nation and a crucial actor
in the redemption of the world. This radical shift involves
developing a comprehensive political program based on
supporters of Christian nationality’s strict understanding of
biblical truth, thereby promoting a vision of the true America
and of true Americans as being Christian.
This movement and its ideas—usually referred to as
Christian conservatism, Christian nationality, or the Christian
right—represent a major political ideology in contemporary
American society.126 These terms are also used to refer to a
125. MICHELLE GOLDBERG, KINGDOM COMING: THE RISE
NATIONALISM 6 (2006)

OF

CHRISTIAN

The United States has always been a pious country, given to
bursts of spiritual fervor, but Christian nationality is
qualitatively different from earlier religious revivals. Like
America’s past Great Awakenings, the Christian nationalist
movement claims that the Bible is absolutely and literally
true. But it goes much further, extrapolating a total political
program from that truth, and yoking that program to a
political party. It is a conflation of scripture and politics that
sees America’s triumphs as confirmation of the truth of the
Christian religion, and America’s struggles as part of a
cosmic contest between God and the devil. It claims
supernatural sanction for its campaign of national renewal
and speaks rapturously about vanquishing the millions of
Americans who would stand in its way. Id.
126. In this Article, I will use Christian nationality as the general name
for American religious nationality, and the Christian Right to mean a more
concrete political movement constituted by these organizations. For an
overview of the rise of the Christian Right, see FRITZ DETWILER, STANDING ON
THE PREMISES OF GOD: THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT’S FIGHT TO REDEFINE AMERICA’S
PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1999); MICHAEL LIENESCH, REDEEMING AMERICA: PIETY AND
POLITICS IN THE NEW CHRISTIAN RIGHT (2014); ANDREW R. MURPHY, PRODIGAL
NATION: MORAL DECLINE AND DIVINE PUNISHMENT FROM NEW ENGLAND TO 9/11
(2008).
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network of political lobbying groups, political actors, and
religious organizations that began operating in the United
States in the late 1970’s.127 These include, among others, Jerry
Falwell’s Moral Majority, Tim LaHaye’s Council for National
Policy, Beverly LaHaye’s Concerned Women for America, Ed
McAteer’s Religious Roundtable, and James Dobson’s Focus on
the Family and Family Research Council. While many of these
organizations atrophied and became irrelevant, the relevance
and power of the Christian nationality movement has endured,
and the movement remains exceptionally relevant in
contemporary American politics. This success can be explained,
in part, by the ability of the movement to develop “multiple
power centers, creating a potent combination of organization
and diffusion. Its center of gravity shifts constantly, and
coalitions are forever forming and dissolving . . . . Any of the
movement’s figureheads or political allies could fall tomorrow
and Christian nationalism would thrive undiminished.”128 In
fact, “[t]he movement is deeply rooted in the American social
structure, drawing its strength from a vibrant, well-politicized
religious constituency and from that constituency’s impressive
organizational infrastructure . . . . In short, the Christian Right
will not go away.”129
127. See Michael J. McVicar, The Religious Right in America, OXFORD
RES. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION (2016)
The phrase Religious Right refers to a loose network of
political actors, religious organizations, and political
pressure groups that formed in the United States in the late
1970s. Also referred to as the Christian Right, representative
organizations associated with the movement included Jerry
Falwell’s Moral Majority, Tim LaHaye’s Council for National
Policy, Beverly LaHaye’s Concerned Women for America, and
Ed McAteer’s Religious Roundtable. Leaders and
organizations associated with the Religious Right made a
broad-based religious appeal to Americans that emphasized
traditional family values, championed free-market
economics, and advocated a hardline foreign policy approach
to the Soviet Union. They also criticized secular and
materialistic trends in American culture that many in the
Religious Right associated with the moral and economic
decline of the nation. Id.
128. GOLDBERG, supra note 125, at 16.
129. DUANE MURRAY OLDFIELD, THE RIGHT AND THE RIGHTEOUS: THE
CHRISTIAN RIGHT CONFRONTS THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 225 (1996).
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Although it is possible that Christian nationalist views may
be quite widely spread amongst American Christians (67% of
American citizens believe that the United States is a Christian
nation),130 the recognizable sub-group that represents the best
representative for American Christian nationality is what John
Green named “traditionalist evangelicals,” constituting
approximately 12.6% of American citizens in 2004.131 In a study
conducted at the end of the 20th century, 92% of evangelical
Christians said they believed America was founded as a
Christian nation; the same percent believed that Christian
values were currently under serious attack; and 95% believed
that they were witnessing the breakdown of American society.132
This seems to indicate that Christian nationality is a central
ideology amongst American evangelicals, which makes it
significant both politically and culturally.
After a retreat from politics during the so-called liberal era
in the United States—from the 1960’s through the early part of
the 1970’s, when prayer in schools was banned and abortions
were legalized by the Supreme Court—conservative Christians
reentered the public sphere during the 1970’s. Jerry Falwell,
one of the leading figures of the nascent Christian Right,
described their reemergence:
Things began to happen.
The invasion of
humanism into the public school system began to
alarm us back in the sixties. Then the Roe v. Wade
Supreme Court decision of 1973 and abortion on
demand shook me up. Then adding to that
gradual regulation of various things it became
very apparent the federal government was going
in the wrong direction and if allowed would be
harassing non‐ public schools, of which I have one
of 16,000 right now. So step by step we became
130. See Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 69% Say Liberals Too
Secular, 49% Say Conservatives Too Assertive: Many Americans Uneasy with
Mix of Religion and Politics, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 24, 2006, 2:00 PM),
https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/legacy-pdf/287.pdf.
131. John C. Green, The American Religious Landscape and Political
Attitudes: A Baseline for 2004 (2004), https://assets.pewresearch.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/11/2007/10/green-full.pdf.
132. CHRISTIAN SMITH ET AL., AMERICAN EVANGELICALISM: EMBATTLED AND
THRIVING 139 (1998).
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convinced we must get involved if we’re going to
continue what we’re doing inside the church
building.133
According to these modern adherents to Christian
nationality, America is God’s country and plays a key role in the
providential plan.
The Christian nationalist version of
American history is a tale of a Godly country that has been
corrupted and fell from grace, holding that
Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution eroded
people’s faith in man’s dignity and God’s
supremacy. The great universities that once saw
Christianity as the root of all knowledge turned
away from scripture and toward the secular
philosophies of a decadent Europe, which put man
at the center of the universe. Franklin Delano
Roosevelt’s New Deal brought socialism to
America and began the process by which
government, rather than churches, became the
guarantors of social welfare.134
The fall was even more pronounced in the field of sexuality,
with homosexuality becoming increasingly mainstream, and
Christianity being banished from the public sphere. However,
according to Christian nationality, God had a plan, and he
“changed the hearts of a few people, and before long, there was
a great revival in the country. Conservative evangelical
churches mushroomed.
Believers shed their apathy, got
organized, and elected godly men.”135 This general historical
narrative promoted by religious nationalist groups is nicely
captured in The Light and the Glory, an evangelical Christian
history book, in which the United States is described as a new
Israel:
In the virgin wilderness of America, God was
133. ED DOBSON ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTALIST PHENOMENON: THE
RESURGENCE OF CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIANITY 144 (1981).
134. GOLDBERG, supra note 125, at 7.
135. Id. at 8.
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making His most significant attempt since
ancient Israel to create a new Israel of people
living in obedience to the laws of God, through
faith in Jesus Christ. Not surprisingly, Christian
Nationalist histories go back to the Puritans. It
was them, they contend, who “made possible
America’s foundation as a Christian nation.”136
Again, in the words of Falwell:
The heritage of the Puritan Pilgrims is one not of
a church, but of a nation; these were men and
women who were not only the progenitors of a
state, but also the ancestors of a nation. We can
thank these courageous people who laid the
religious foundation of our nation for the freedom
and liberty we so liberally enjoy today.137
For Christian evangelicals, the United States was founded
according to the Divine plan, and its society and politics should
adhere to God’s laws. Like ancient Israel, the United States is
an attempt to bring redemption to the world, and it is a major
actor in the struggle against evil. Central for the Christian
nationalist worldview is the idea of the corruption of America.
The status of the United States as a redemptive force is under
constant peril in their eyes, being challenged by those who try to
secularize society.
These challenges are reflected most
powerfully in the new social acceptance of abortion and LGBT
rights, which the Christian evangelicals consider abhorrent
behavior. These issues help animate Christians’ call for action.
Adherents of Christian nationality are “troubled patriots, who
believe that America has broken its covenant and drifted from
its original purpose. Thus they are determined to bring their
country back to its spiritual beginnings, reminding Americans
repeatedly that theirs is a biblical republic.”138 The ideology of
the contemporary American religious nationalist critique is “an
indictment of national sin” based on a “story of a prodigal nation
136. LIENESCH, supra note 126, at 141.
137. Id. at 145.
138. Id. at 155.
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that has fallen away from its covenant.”139 For supporters of
Christian nationality, the legalization of abortion in Roe v. Wade
is central to the understanding of American moral decline.
Falwell writes that “if we expect God to honor and bless our
nation, we must take a stand against abortion.”140 This is a
powerful call for action: the United States has strayed from its
Divine path, and it is up to the adherents of American religious
nationality to redeem it.
Christian nationality sees the political legitimacy of the
American state as grounded on being a Christian nation in
covenant with God. It is believed that the United States has a
crucial role to play in the unfolding of God’s plan. As a result,
any unwillingness to follow biblical principles and the outline of
this plan will result in great harm both to the nation and the
world. It follows that the state must act in accordance with
Christian norms. The Christian nationalist narrative calls for a
unification of religion and politics, with the latter subservient to
the former. The strongest version of this view, held by a
minority of backers of Christian nationality, is Dominionism,
which represents the “idea that Christians have a God-given
right to rule.”141 People who hold this view, or Dominion
theologians, believe that “the inheritors and custodians of this
world are Christians who can ‘name it and claim it’ by divine
right.”142
Christian Reconstructionists, the sect which
introduced Dominionism to the American scene, advocate for the
replacement of “American civil law with Old Testament biblical
law.”143 In recent decades, the “tone” of Dominion theology has
“softened and it has become increasingly palatable to
mainstream evangelicals.”144 While it is still a marginal position
even within Christian nationalist circles, its extreme positions
help expose the crucial difference between American civil
religion and American Christian nationality. The latter, even in
its milder forms, calls for the unification of politics and religion

139. MURPHY, supra note 126, at 88.
140. Id. at 90–91.
141. GOLDBERG, supra note 125, at 13.
142. GARRY WILLS, UNDER GOD: RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 174
(1990).
143. GOLDBERG, supra note 125, at 13.
144. James Aho, Christian Heroism and the Reconstruction of America,
39 CRITICAL SOC. 545, 546 (2012).
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and insists that America is a Christian nation and must behave
accordingly. This is why the legalization of abortion and samesex marriage, as examples of anti-biblical state behavior,
became the rallying cry of Christian nationality.
The belief in the necessary confluence of religion and politics
makes Christian nationality a powerful and comprehensive
political ideology. The civil religious position that politics and
religion are somewhat related is, in contrast, quite weak. The
idea that the United States is a shining city upon a hill, and that
it has a proactive and providential role in the world, does not
necessitate the aggressive involvement of any particular
religious view in political disputes. This ideological distinction
and the interrelationships among civil religion, Christian
nationality, and civic nationality will be discussed next.
D. Intimate Rivalry
The civil religion tradition represents a major strain in
American civic nationality in that it is a valid and fully
acceptable part of public discourse which supports the
legitimacy of state authority. Civic nationality is a “master
narrative,” or a set of stories that make political authority
legitimate or illegitimate to the people. Master narratives are
ways of assembling popular social movements and coalitions so
that they have the potential to create dramatic changes in
politics.145 The master narrative of civic nationality is comprised
of a set of stories which legitimize the state as it currently is, not
necessarily in all its details, but in the perception of its basic
character. These narratives are supported by the state through
rituals, education, and rhetoric.146 They are also produced
145. ASHUTOSH VARSHNEY, ETHNIC CONFLICT AND CIVIC LIFE: HINDUS AND
MUSLIMS IN INDIA 55 (2002).
By “master narratives” I mean the major organizing devices
for mass politics, or the leading political idioms that mobilize
large numbers of people. Master narratives tell stories that
make the critical issues in politics intelligible to the masses.
They are ways of putting together popular social coalitions so
that politics can be altered and political power won. Id.
146. See generally DAVID I. KERTZER, RITUAL, POLITICS, AND POWER (1988)
(explaining the centrality or rituals in political life).
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independently from the state in the private sector, in popular
culture, and literature.147 The content and limits of civic
nationality are in constant flux. In any society, but especially in
a pluralist and democratic environment, many voices may be
found competing to have their legitimacy enhanced by being
perceived as an integral part of mainstream national culture.
Crucially, being perceived as not being a part of the “legitimate”
discourse of civic nationality can generate immense opposition
to ideological positions and political movements. It suffices to
recall the extensive cultural, political, and legal hostility once
directed against the American Communist Party.
American mainstream nationality is primarily civic and
liberal, consisting of a narrative centered on the will, interests,
and values of the American people. However, this secular
narrative exists in a symbiotic relationship with the narratives
of American civil religion. It is this alliance which makes
Christian nationality a palatable voice in American politics.
The argument developed in this Part is that although
Christian nationality promotes positions which differ radically
from—and, in fact, are adverse to—those of today’s civic
nationality, Christian nationality faces almost no resistance.
This may be due to the intersections between the ideas of
Christian nationality and those of the American civil religion.
As stated previously, the two ideologies hold fundamentally
different positions regarding the relationship of the state to
religion. Nevertheless, the ideas and positions of America’s civil
religion, which have been, and still remain, part of the
mainstream of political discourse in the United States, make
Christian nationalist ideology sound acceptable and legitimate
to many.
This relationship can be labelled overlapping
legitimation. Both narratives operate concurrently in society to
explain and justify state authority.
In the master narratives of both civic and Christian
nationality, authority rests in the metaphysical realm. The
Divine is an analogous cultural institution to the sovereign,
making the Divine and the sovereign potential rivals; both can
potentially guarantee order in society and both claim final,
supreme authority. Crucially, they also both give moral
147. E.g., PAUL W. KAHN, FINDING OURSELVES AT THE MOVIES: PHILOSOPHY
NEW GENERATION (2013) (holding that the cultural imagination of
popular sovereignty is maintained by popular culture).
FOR A
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credence to life-and-death decisions, including the right to kill
and the call to make a sacrifice.148 It is an oxymoron to imagine
two entities as being supreme, as one can be called to sacrifice
either by the sovereign or by God, but not by both.149 Thus,
either God or the sovereign can decide matters of life and death,
but not both.
The United States Constitution is a good example of a civic
nationalist text, as demonstrated by its opening words: “We the
People of the United States” that “ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America.”150 There is no
mention of God as the ultimate authority behind the state. It is
the will of the popular sovereign that is the source of the law and
the foundation of the nation itself.151 Contrast this with the
many different proposals for a Christian amendment to the
constitution which often include the words, “Almighty God as
the source of all authority and power in civil government,” or
state that they accept the “Divine Authority of the Holy
Scriptures, the law of God as the paramount rule.”152
A major force behind the strength of the Christian
nationalist narrative is the idea that civic or secular nationality
148. See generally JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 69, at 32 (stating “the
awareness of being subject to an authority—an authority invested with the
power of life and death—gives nationality its potency”); PAUL W. KAHN,
POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR NEW CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 7
(2011) (“Liberal theory puts contrast at the origins of the political community;
political theology puts sacrifice at the point of origin.”).
149. Roger Friedland, Religious Nationalism and the Problem of
Collective Representation, 27 ANN. REV. SOC. 125, 128 (2001) (“Religious
discourse is replete with martial metaphor, of battles and enemies, of position
and siege . . . . Religion, a cosmology accomplished through violence, its cosmic
war vicariously experienced and domesticated by rite, is thus inherently a
natural competitor to the nationality of the secular state.“).
150. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
151. PAUL W. KAHN, PUTTING LIBERALISM IN ITS PLACE 17 (2005)
The sovereign will, we say, is the source of law, and indeed of
the nation itself. To identify with the popular sovereign is to
understand the self in and through will. It is to read the self—
quite literally the finite body—as a point of access to, and
expression of, the nation, which confronts us as an ultimate
value. Id.
152. DANIEL K. WILLIAMS, GOD’S OWN PARTY: THE MAKING OF THE
CHRISTIAN RIGHT 17 (2010) (explaining that similar language was part of the
Constitution of the Confederate States).
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is a corrupting ideology. That is, that only Christian nationality
authentically represents what the nation was once and what it
ought to be. In the United States, the ideology of Christian right
is an indictment of American secularism and liberalism. The
emergence and increasing strength of these ideological forces
after the 1960’s in the face of what they called “secular
humanism” was accompanied by placing blame on the United
States for leaving the divine path and losing God’s protection.153
Pat Robertson tells the story:
Until modern times, the foundations of law rested
on the Judeo‐ Christian concept of right and
wrong and the foundational concept of Original
Sin . . . . Modern, secular sociology, however,
shuns such biblical teachings in favor of an
evolutionary hypothesis based on the ideas of
Darwin, Freud, Einstein, and others. This view,
often called “secular humanism,” takes the view
that man has evolved from the slime and that with
time and ever greater freedoms, mankind will
ascend to the stars. These ideas, which are
contrary to the Word of God, have led directly to
the bitter conflict and social chaos of our day . . . .
The legacy of the 1960s is still with us today. The
free‐ love,
anti‐ war,
psychedelic
1960s
proclaimed not only the right of dissent but the
right to protest against and defame the most
sacred institutions of the nation.154
The corrupting influence of American liberal humanism is a
cause and a call for Christian action, as Jerry Falwell describes
it:

153. See MURPHY, supra note 126, at 80 (“From the beginning, the
Christian Right had been driven by a powerful narrative of imperiled national
promise, of a prodigal yet once chosen nation that had forsaken its moral and
spiritual foundations in favor of secular humanism.”); John Keller, The Two
Jeremiads in American Political Thought, W. POL. SCI. ASS’N 2011 ANN.
MEETING
PAPER
(Feb.
22,
2011),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1766824.
154. PAT ROBERTSON, THE TURNING TIDE 112–13 (1993).
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Things began to happen.
The invasion of
humanism into the public school system began to
alarm us back in the sixties. Then the Roe v. Wade
Supreme Court decision of 1973 and abortion on
demand shook me up . . . . So step by step we
became convinced we must get involved if we’re
going to continue what we’re doing inside the
church building.155
The narrative contrasts this corrupt, inauthentic national
existence with both the shining past and with contemporary
Christian communities. In the words of Bruce Lincoln, “[t]here
is a good, faithful Christian America that has been brought to
mortal peril by the actions and views of another part of the
nation that is secular and immoral. Secular America was the
problem, to which Christian America . . . was the solution.”156
Consequently, supporters of Christian nationality see it as their
duty to bring America back into the grace of God.
When religious nationality is a legitimate part of the
national narrative, its adherents are able to promote their point
of view and agenda by using the political machine of the state.
Although they hold a radically different understanding of the
state, and call for major transformation of that state, the fact
that they are seen as a plausible and acceptable part of the
national narrative means that they do not meet the same
exclusionary and aggressive opposition met by others. This
creates a relationship of intimate rivalry, which is quite unique.
In fact, due to the fact that Christian nationality is a socially
plausible legitimating narrative of the state, it is able to present
itself as merely a reforming force. In this manifestation, the
state has been corrupted and led away from its wholesome roots
by civic nationality and liberalism, and needs to be shepherded
back by the religious nationalists.
This vision is captured well by the softer-spoken founder of
the Christian Coalition, Ralph Reed, who promises in his book
that if Christian activists had their way

155. ED DOBSON ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTALIST PHENOMENON: THE
RESURGENCE OF CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIANITY 144 (Jerry Falwell ed., 1981).
156. BRUCE LINCOLN, HOLY TERRORS: THINKING ABOUT RELIGION AFTER
SEPTEMBER 11, at 38 (2d ed. 2006).
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America would look much as it did for most of the
first two centuries of its existence, before the
social dislocations caused by Vietnam, the sexual
revolution, Watergate, and the explosion of the
welfare state. Our nation would once again be
ascendant, self‐ confident, proud, and morally
strong.
Government would be strong, the
citizenry virtuous, and mediating institutions
such as churches and voluntary organizations,
would carry out many of the functions currently
relegated to the bureaucracy.157
This America, Reed proclaims, is the authentic America. By
actively engaging in politics, winning elections, and confirming
sympathetic judges, the Christian right will be able to beat back
the forces of secularism and “[t]ake America [b]ack.”158
Due to the relatively broad acceptability of their national
Christian message, and the fact that many of their beliefs
overlap with those held by other groups, including
conservatives, libertarians, and non-nationalist religious
groups, the Republican Party (“the GOP”) has been able to
integrate Christian right into its ideologies and become highly
influential.159 Although they do not hold sway over American
politics as a whole, the Christian right has exerted its political
power within the GOP, and adherents of Christian nationality
have become a major force within the GOP in the last few
decades. As Daniel Williams wrote in his book about the rise of
the Christian right, while “evangelical Christians had become
Republicans, the Republican Party had also become
Christianized, and it was becoming increasingly difficult to tell
the difference between the Christian Coalition’s issue positions
and the GOP platform.”160 Their near-domination of one of the
two major political parties is an immense achievement for
Christian nationality and was a result of decades-long political
action. During this time
157. RALPH REED, POLITICALLY INCORRECT:
IN AMERICAN POLITICS 36–37 (1994).

THE EMERGING FAITH FACTOR

158. Id. at 37.
159. See FRANCES FITZGERALD, THE EVANGELICALS: THE STRUGGLE
SHAPE AMERICA 411 (Simon & Schuster ed., 2017).
160. WILLIAMS, supra note 152, at 231.
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Conservative Christians have flocked to local and
state party caucuses, taking control of the
Republican apparatus in at least eighteen
states—not only evangelical strongholds in the
South but also such apparently unlikely places as
Minnesota, Iowa, and Oregon. By conventional
wisdom, about one-fourth of the delegates to the
Republican national convention are thought to be
affiliated with this bloc, giving them substantial
platform influence.161
This made the Christian right the de facto king makers in the
GOP.
The presentation of Christian nationality—not as a
revolutionary force but as a legitimate opposition—has also been
facilitated by Christian nationality’s basic acceptance of the idea
of democratic rule. That is, they accept “the political apparatus
of the modern nation-state.”162 Most Christian nationalist
leaders and thinkers consider both democracy and the
Constitution extremely important. The agenda of Christian
nationality takes issue with the content and source of authority
of politics, but not with the form they currently take. Although
some supporters of Christian nationality see democracy only as
a means to achieving a theocracy,163 the mainstream voices see
it, and constitutional republicanism, as “most consistent with
the biblical view of the nature of man and the danger of
power,”164 and, therefore, as “the one great hope of freedom in a
sin-cursed world.”165
The evidence indicates that Christian nationalist ideology
represents a fundamental alternative to American civic
nationality. Its adherents are able to present themselves as the

161. KENNETH D. WALD & ALLISON CALHOUN-BROWN, RELIGION AND
POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 230 (6th ed. 2010).
162. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 69, at 6.
163. GEORGE GRANT, THE CHANGING OF THE GUARD: BIBLICAL PRINCIPLES
FOR POLITICAL ACTION 51 (Gary North ed., 1987).
164. JOHN EIDSMOE, GOD AND CAESAR: BIBLICAL FAITH AND POLITICAL
ACTION 17 (1997).
165. ED DOBSON & EDWARD E. HINDSON, THE SEDUCTION OF POWER:
PREACHERS, POLITICS AND THE MEDIA 131 (1988).
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carriers of the true, pure nature of the nation-state. They also
accept and use the current political mechanisms of the nationstate, including democracy, to advance their agenda. As a result,
Christian nationality, unlike other forms of threatening
opposition, such as communism or minority nationality, is able
to co-exist with civic nationality while vying for political and
cultural power.
This thick account of Christian nationality—both historical
and contemporary—will be key in demonstrating that the
political division theory—when applied to it—is persuasive.
This is the task of the next Part.
IV. Christian Nationality and the Political Division Theory
Part II of this Article laid out the political division theory
and its main critiques. It demonstrated that when applied to
religion generally, the political division theory makes little
sense. Part III turned to the history and ideology of American
Christian nationality and offered a new conceptualization of its
relationship with American national identity: intimate rivalry.
This Part will strive to show that when applied to Christian
nationality, the political division theory is plausible and useful.
I will present this in two stages: first, arguing that this religious
nationalist ideology is uniquely divisive and perilous (the
distinctiveness criteria); and second, arguing that it can be
prevented by a strict interpretation of non-establishment (the
cogency criteria).
A. The Distinctiveness of Christian Nationality
What makes Christian nationality unique through the
prism of the political division theory is that it promotes the idea
that the American identity is grounded in a specific religion.166
National identity can be more or less inclusive and more or less
morally and politically attractive.167 In order to understand this
166. GORSKI, supra note 86, at 7 (explaining that religious nationalists
wish the boundaries of the religious and political communities to be as
coterminous as possible; liberal secularists seek to keep the religious and
political communities as separate as possible; and civil religionists).
167. See generally CRAIG J. CALHOUN, NATIONALISM (1997); MARGARET
CANOVAN, NATIONHOOD AND POLITICAL THEORY (1998); SMITH, supra note 77.
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spectrum, we must distinguish between the encompassing
nature of all state-oriented national identities (such as civil
nationality and Christian nationality) and how inclusive they
make membership in the common political identity. By the
encompassing nature, I mean the fact that it both sees the state
and the entire citizen body as their subject. In this sense, all
national identities are—to a large extent—exclusionary: they
rely on a strong distinction between members and non-members
and are naturally hostile towards competing national
movements.168
The key conceptual point, because the
encompassing nature is a constant in all state-oriented national
identities, is that the main moral distinction between national
identities is going to be the inclusivity of their membership
threshold. In cases (like Christian nationality) in which the
ideology is exclusive and intolerant, the encompassing nature of
national identities exacerbates the moral problem tenfold.
When a reclusive religious group is intolerant, the fact that they
seek to separate themselves from the state and society makes it
possible to resolve the issue by cultural accommodation. This is
not true when we combine an encompassing nationality with an
intolerant ideology. In this case, the subject of the exclusivity
and intolerance becomes the state itself. This is the reason that
promoting American identity, which is grounded in a specific
religion, poses an especially severe danger for political division.
How does this take shape in the case of Christian nationality?
The center of American Civic nationality, for instance, is
commonly held to be a much more morally palatable form of
common political identity. This inclusivity seems to derive from
at least two sources. The first is the fact that civil American
identity is grounded in a common political/legal project and
values that are often seen as encapsulated by the
Constitution.169 If an American is defined by being a part of the
168. SCHMITT, supra note 75, at 28 (“The distinction of friend and enemy
denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an
association or disassociation [sic] . . . [the enemy] is, in an especially intense
way, existentially something different and alien, so that in extreme cases
conflicts with him are possible.”).
169. CRAIG CALHOUN, NATIONS MATTER: CULTURE, HISTORY, AND THE
COSMOPOLITAN DREAM 42 (2007) (“[C]ivic nations can in principle be open to
anyone who agrees to follow their laws. Citizenship in the state is seen as
primary rather than prior membership in a descent group or cultural
tradition.”).
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political project of the United States, then joining the nation is
quite possible. This is in contrast to more ethnic nations which
are connected by an imagined primordial, pre-political, ties.170 If
being Danish is being a part of the “ethnos” of Danes, it is all but
impossible for an immigrant to join. The second reason behind
the inclusivity of American Civic nationality is that it is an
ambiguous and thin political ideology. As Craig Calhoun puts
it: “civic nations can in principle be open to anyone who agrees
to follow their laws. Citizenship in the state is seen as primary,
rather than prior membership in a descent group or cultural
tradition.”171 The legitimacy generated by American Civic
nationality comes with very little concrete ideological strings,
and is thus “relatively flexible and all purpose.”172 American
civil nationality is concerned with the ultimate source of political
legitimacy—”We the People”—but is not attached to a welldefined political ideology. Agreeing that “the People” are the
source of political authority is far easier than accepting that the
United States has a crucial role to play in the Divine plan. This
makes the unifying civil identity in the United States quite
inclusive, potentially including all individuals (or citizens)
within its boundaries. The fact that American Civic nationality
is grounded on participation in a political project, and that it is
ideologically ambiguous, makes it perfectly suited for creating
social solidarity in a nation as diverse and populous as the
United States.
This is not true in the case of Christian nationality. The
first issue here is the explosive combination of the normative
thickness of religion with the encompassing nature of a
nationalist ideology. As I just stated, a part of the political
attractiveness of American Civic nationality is that it is a thin
(and thus more easily inclusive) ideology. Christian nationality
is on the other side of the spectrum: it attaches American
national identity to a very limited set of ideological options and
to membership in one (albeit diverse) religious group. It is true
that religion as a defining feature of a nation functions
differently than ethnicity: there is perhaps more of a possibility
170. Id. at 41 (“Ethnic nationalism, conversely, refers precisely to rooting
political identity and obligation in the existence of a prepolitical collective
unit—the nation—which achieves political subjectivity by virtue of the state.”).
171. Id. at 42.
172. CANOVAN, supra note 167, at 74.
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for a newcomer to “convert” into “We the People” than to join a
group unified by primordial ties. However, this does not mean
that Christian nationality is able to fulfill the solidarity
enhancing role of civic nationality. Equating being an American
with being a Christian is quite literally to cause “political
division along religious lines,” which is, in the words of Chief
Justice Burger, “one of the principal evils against which the
First Amendment was intended to protect.”173 By equating the
nation with religion, Christian nationality implies that someone
who is not of the faith cannot be a “true” American. This leaves
a large percent of the citizen body unavoidably feeling alienated
and excluded. Combine this with the heavy political and moral
ideological baggage of Christian nationality, which is not only
invested in defining the American people, but also with the ways
in which they and their country conducts themselves. Here, we
find a political identity and ideology which is deeply invested in
both identifying the ultimate authority (the Divine) and laying
down significant ideological constraints on the operation of
political authority and on membership in the nation.174 America
is not only a Christian nation, but it must also act as one. This
brings us right back to the political division theory, which comes,
in the words of Justice Black, to prevent linking “state and
churches together in controlling the lives and destinies of our
citizenship—a citizenship composed of people of myriad religious
faiths, some of them bitterly hostile to and completely intolerant
of the others.”175 Although this may not be a valid concern when
applied to other reclusive religious groups, like the Old Order
Amish, it is directly relevant when applied to a religious ideology
whose subject is the identity and behavior of the state itself.
The status of Christian nationality as an intimate rival in
American politics and culture makes its divisive potential even
more pronounced. The status of intimate rivalry means that the
supporters or Christian nationality are spared much of the
political, legal, and cultural pressures other radical groups face.
For example, compare the moral and political rejection quite
justly experienced by white nationalist groups in the United
States with the way in which the GOP has embraced Christian
173. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
174. See discussion infra Part III.C.
175. Bd. of Educ. Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 251 (1968)
(Black, J., dissenting).
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nationality.176 This rejection occurs despite the fact that many
of the policies promoted by white nationality and Christian
nationality actually overlap.177 Being a legitimate part of the
political culture allows Christian nationality to escape much of
this disapprobation and, even more significantly, enables it to
harness the political and legal institutions of the state for its
own goals.
Using this institutional capacity, American
Christian nationality, as an intimate rival, is able to apply its
encompassing and intolerant ideology in ways unavailable to
other groups seeking to transform the regime, whether from the
right or the left, thus creating a profoundly uneven democratic
playing field. It is hard to identify another political movement
which enjoys this status.
Christian nationality tends to reflect fundamentalist,
orthodox religious convictions.178 Religious national movements
are revivalist in nature, presenting themselves as strong
alternatives to civic nationality and the western “corruption” of
liberalism. They are often reliant on a strong redemptive
narrative, which justifies, or even demands, intense state
intervention in the social and moral life of citizens.179 Groups
like those in the Christian right “seek to protect and deepen
religious identity—to promote a formidable religious presence—
by competing with other religious movements and with secular
institutions and philosophies for resources and allegiances.”180
In fact, the collective identity of adherents to Christian
nationality may make their need to distinguish themselves from
other groups even stronger than that of other fundamentalist
religious groups.
For example, studies have found that
“Christian nationalism influences whites’ regulating of racial
boundaries (evidenced in intermarriage attitudes) above and
beyond the independent effects of political conservatism or
religious exclusivism.”181 The same holds true regarding animus
176. See discussion infra Part III.D.
177. See Samuel L. Perry & Andrew L. Whitehead, Christian
Nationalism and White Racial Boundaries: Examining Whites’ Opposition to
Interracial Marriage, 38 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 1671 (2015) (examining the
ideological overlap between white nationality and Christian nationality).
178. See sources cited infra notes 163–66.
179. See generally GORSKI, supra note 86.
180. GABRIEL A. ALMOND ET AL., STRONG RELIGION: THE RISE OF
FUNDAMENTALISMS AROUND THE WORLD 17 (2003).
181. Perry & Whitehead, supra note 177, at 1672.
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towards immigrants.182 The belief that the United States is a
Christian nation also “increases desires for group conformity
and strict control for both criminals and ‘troublemakers.’”183
Some sociologists suggest that the reason for the hybrid identity
of Christian nationality, or even religious nationality generally,
is that the more unified one’s identity, the higher the perception
of threat from outsiders.184 Because the identity of adherents of
Christian nationality is more unified than that of other
adherents to strong religions which also may have national
identities, it is highly plausible that supporters of Christian
nationality are less tolerant. In short, the members of the
Christian right tend to hold a range of fundamentalist religious
beliefs and engage in fundamentalist religious practices, which
provide them with their sources of loyalty and knowledge in
society. Consequently, there is strong evidence to support a
presumption of intolerance associated with the category of
religious nationality, in contrast to the category of general
religious belief. At the very least, this presumption is valid
regarding the religious understanding of the legitimacy and
purpose of the state. Religious nationality is often in the position
of both rejecting the rule of reason and accepting revelation as
the basis for its ideology. While it cannot be said that religion
generally produces more intolerance and is thus especially
divisive, in the case of religious nationality, it is reasonable to
argue that it does produce more intolerance and is especially
divisive.
It can, therefore, be seen that Christian nationality is an
ideology that is very likely to be intolerant; that has a deeper,
more divisive and alienating understanding of the state; and is
uniquely situated to influence and even dramatically transform
the state. Christian nationality transforms the struggle for
political power and state support into a religious conflict with
both other religions and adherents of civic nationality. These
characteristics form the basis of the distinctiveness of Christian
nationality in light of the civil peace and alienation rationales.
182. See Eric Leon McDaniel et al., Divine Boundaries: How Religion
Shapes Citizens’ Attitudes Toward Immigrants, 39 AM. POL. RES. 205 (2011).
183. Joshua Davis, Enforcing Christian Nationalism: Examining the
Link Between Group Identity and Punitive Attitudes in the United States, 57 J.
SCI. STUDY RELIGION 300, 300 (2018).
184. Id. at 303.
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Given that this description of the distinctiveness of
Christian nationality’s challenge to the civil peace is accepted,
the cogency criteria must then be examined. I argue that the
cogency criterion is met, thus supporting a policy of nonestablishment.
To understand this conclusion, the first step is to examine
the proposition that the encompassing and public nature of
Christian nationality makes other measures, such as freedom of
religion, less effective in achieving a modus vivendi. This means
that the “Jeffersonian compromise,” described by Richard Rorty
as the idea that “we shall not be able to keep a democratic
political community going unless the religious believers remain
willing to trade privatization for a guarantee of religious
liberty,”185 does not apply to Christian nationality. If religious
freedoms and exemptions are sufficient to sustain a relatively
strife-free relationship between religious groups and the state,
then strict or neutral non-establishment does not follow from the
political division theory. In constitutional language, this means
that if guaranteeing the free exercise of religion is sufficient to
produce and sustain civil peace, why is non-establishment,
understood through the prism of the political division theory,
necessary? However, because the ideological subject matter of
Christian nationality is the identity and behavior of the United
States as a whole, providing exemptions from generally
applicable laws does nothing to mitigate or eliminate Christian
nationality’s belief that the United States is being corrupted by
the current ruling ideologies of civic nationality and liberalism.
Adherents to Christian nationality are deeply interested in
“dominating the realms of American institutional morality . . .
or simply put, creating a state beholden to Christian beliefs.”186
Ensuring that the state does not coerce them into acting against
their deeply held beliefs is simply insufficient in the case of an
ideology which is interested in coercing the state to behave in
accordance with their beliefs. A plausible solution to this
problem is to apply non-establishment in order to make it harder
for Christian nationality to succeed in transforming the state
and the public sphere into a less inclusive, more Christian, place.
The intimate rivalry of Christian nationality is another
185. Richard Rorty, Religion as Conversation-Stopper, 3 UNIV. ST.
ANDREWS: COMMON KNOWLEDGE 1, 3 (1994).
186. Davis, supra note 183, at 300–01.
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reason which makes non-establishment an especially relevant
remedy. One can argue that because Christianity is a part of the
overlapping legitimation of the state, it is already partially and
informally established. While it is implausible that anyone
would state that the United States is a Jewish country, for many
Americans it is perfectly reasonable to state that it is a Christian
country. In essence, according to the political division theory
presented herein, there is no need to be especially concerned
with the establishment of any of the minority religions. In
contrast, the fact that Christianity is already so ingrained in
American civic nationality makes establishment of Christianity
an actual risk. This prospect, combined with the ideological
imperative of transforming the United States into a Christian
nation, strengthen the case for non-establishment. If the status
of intimate rivalry makes Christian nationality uniquely
capable of influencing the state, then it is both judicious and
prudent to make the wall of separation both high and formal.
If the civil peace and alienation rationales convincingly
apply only to religious nationality or similar ideologies, why not
just forbid the state from being involved in institutions and
policies related to Christian nationality? Why is across-theboard non-establishment necessary to prevent just one type of
state-religion entanglement? There are two main reasons. The
first is that it is impossible for a court to distinguish accurately
between what constitutes civil peace endangering type of
religion and a benign one. That is, the fact that Christian
nationality should be kept at arm’s length does not mean that
this can be translated into useful, and even somewhat accurate,
judicial tools. In short, the inability to fairly identify the subcategory of Christian nationality makes it necessary to separate
a more recognizable criterion: that of “religion” from the state.
This is a similar case to that of freedom of speech protections
under the First Amendment. Here, although not all speech is
actually valuable and, thus, warrants protection, courts are
perceived as inappropriate institutions to make this distinction.
Thus, First Amendment doctrine protects a much wider category
of speech than what is actually valuable speech.187 In analogy,
the political division theory, as presented here, seeks to prevent

187. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First
Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267 (1991).
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a certain type of political danger posed by a particular kind of
establishment. However, since courts are not equipped to decide
which religious phenomena is actually dangerous, the
constitution separates religion as a general category.
To conclude, the goal of this Part of the Article is to show
that although the political division theory for non-establishment
can be quite easily dismissed when applied to religion as a
general category, it is quite persuasive when applied to
Christian nationality. Let me turn to the potential ramifications
this version of the political division theory may hold for
Establishment Clause doctrine.
V. The Constitutional Implications of Political Division
If one of the principal goals of non-establishment is to
prevent the political promotion of a religiously defined civic
identity, then this goal should influence our interpretation of the
Establishment Clause.
The political division theory presented in this Article
strongly supports almost all of the existing, and wellestablished, Establishment Clause rules.
The state, for
instance, is not permitted to engage in any speech that endorses
or promotes religion.188 This disables government officials and
institutions from endorsing and promoting Christian nationality
in their official capacity. In a concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly,
Justice O’Connor makes the connection between formal
endorsement and political identity explicit, stating that “[t]he
Establishment Clause prohibits government from making
adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s
standing in the political community.”189 Religion cannot be a
threshold condition for membership in the political community.
This also encompasses the rule that the state may not use a
religious test as a condition for public office.190 One of the major
political harms of the equation of Christian Identity and
American Identity is that this will exclude non-Christians (or
the incorrect kind of Christians) from political power. This type
of rule makes certain, at least formally, that this will not occur.
188. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
189. 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
190. See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
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Another type of rule that fits well with the political division
theory is the one that requires that laws have a secular
legislative purpose.191 This cuts at the root of any attempt to
promote legislation that is mainly motivated by religious norms.
The common principle among all of the rules and cases that
fit well within the political division theory is that they protect
the public sphere and the state from being captured by religion.
The general normative thrust of the political division theory is
that it is deeply concerned about establishment which seeks to
transform the political and public spheres. The rules that
govern the purposes of legislation and the identity of the
legislators seem to protect against such concerns. As was
discussed above, the distinctive attribute of Christian
nationality is its theological concern with the identity and
behavior of the nation and the state. The type of establishment
that adherents of Christian nationality seek to promote is one
that is meant to reform the public sphere and the state to
conform to their religious ideology. It is not surprising that they
seek to reverse the chain of cases which removed religion from
public schools: first, establishing in Engel v. Vitale192 that official
state-school prayer violates the Establishment Clause; and then
in Abington Township v. Schempp193 that public schoolsponsored religious activities, including bible readings, was also
unconstitutional. It is the encompassing and nature of Christian
nationality which makes it so different than other religious
movements.
What, however, does the political division theory have to say
about religious establishment that clearly does not seek to
transform or reform the public and political sphere? On the
other end of the spectrum from Christian nationality lie insular,
reclusive religious groups, such as Chassidic Jews or Old Order
Amish. The desire to transform public institutions is completely
foreign to these groups. Rather, they seek to protect themselves
from being transformed by society, and often do not care at all
for the identity and behavior of the state when it does not
concern itself with them. Does state support (in whatever shape)
191. For a discussion of the requirement that laws have a secular
legislative purpose, see Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV.
87, 95–98 (2002), and the cases discussed therein.
192. See 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
193. See 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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to the education systems of reclusive religious groups raise the
same set of concerns as the school prayer cases? If we are
convinced that the main concern of non-establishment is to
prevent religious capture of the state, then it would appear that
supporting these groups seems less hazardous. In this way, the
political division theory opens the door for a more lenient
interpretation of the Establishment Clause when it comes to
involvement with religion which is not public-facing. As
discussed above, non-establishment has (at least) four possible
interpretations: (1) strict separation; (2) neutrality; (3) noncoercion; and (4) non-institutionalization. Strict separation,
which is about creating a secular public order, seems to meet the
concerns of the political division theory when it applies to it
establishment which has the potential for transforming the
political sphere. However, potentially, when it applies to
establishment which merely enables religious communities to
maintain their identity by isolating themselves from society,
perhaps a more lenient standard, such as the non-coercion
interpretation (which allows government intervention with
religion as long as it does not coerce anyone to accept religion) is
a better fit.
VI. Conclusion
The prevalence of the political division theory of nonestablishment in the Supreme Court is warranted. The political
division theory makes perfect sense when applied to a religion
which seeks to collapse the distinction between national politics
and religion. Christian nationality falls well within this
category. The encompassing theological investment of the
ideology of Christian nationality in the behavior and identity of
the United States makes it especially divisive. If this type of
ideology is adopted and promoted by state organs, this will
clearly create great alienation and resentment among US
citizens. This is a worthy goal for the Establishment Clause.
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